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Peer-to-Peer Financing for Development: Regulating the Intermediaries 
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Forthcoming in the NYU Journal of International Law & Politics 
Abstract
Private actors channel capital to inhabitants of developing countries 
through a growing variety of intermediaries.  Some of those intermediaries 
operate much like conventional charities, some operate more like for-
profit financial institutions, yet others combine features of these models.  
The last category is growing fast.  It also holds the promise of integrating 
foreign aid and private development finance to bring diversification 
opportunities for investors, new funding for development, and creative 
ways to improve development outcomes.   Considering the potential reach 
of such hybrid finance, determining the appropriate regulatory framework 
for it is an important challenge, which joins policy debates about 
regulating financial innovation, consumer financial protection, and 
revitalizing foreign assistance after the global economic crisis.  This paper 
takes up that challenge by canvassing the regulatory frameworks currently 
applied to charities, banks and investment intermediaries; identifying the 
problems with the regulatory discontinuities created by the status quo; and 
suggesting reforms. 
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I. Introduction 
Until recently, foreign aid was the business of governments, while private actors 
dominated other forms of financing for developing countries.  Member states of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provided foreign 
aid—that is to say, financing on below-market terms to governments in poor and middle-
income states—either directly or through multilateral agencies such as the World Bank 
and regional development banks.1  Private financing for developing countries, apart from 
migrant remittances, came in the overlapping forms of project finance, bank loans, 
foreign direct investment, and portfolio investment, where the private funders received 
market rates of return.2  Aid from public sources3 was coordinated—primarily through 
the OECD.4  Private financing was regulated—primarily through traditional bank and 
securities laws in the donor states and, to a lesser extent, through administrative measures 
in the recipient states. 
At the turn of the century, private financial market participants have begun to 
embrace development policy goals on a significant scale, and to show a greater 
willingness to trade off financial returns for development outcomes.  Major foundations 
have joined forces with donor governments, and have taken some business from 
traditional development agencies—funding large-scale public and private-sector 
programs in health, welfare, and economic development in poor and middle-income 
1 We use the term “foreign aid” here to include both  Official Development Assistance  (ODA) 
(government grants or loans to poor and middle-income countries and multilateral agencies for 
development purposes, where the grant element is not less than 25 percent), and Official Development 
Finance (“ODF”) (government and multilateral financing for development with a grant element below 25 
percent).  See Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Development [OECD], Development Co-operation Directorate 
[DCD-DAC], DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts (DAC Glossary), 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/glossary (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).  Developing country recipients are 
determined using World Bank national income categories.  OECD DCD-DAC, DAC List of ODA 
Recipients Used for 2008, 2009 and 2010 Flows, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist (last visited Apr. 2, 
2010).
2 Public agencies in OECD and recipient countries often participate in such transactions, especially project 
finance, providing explicit and implicit subsidies.  For an example of government participation in such 
transactions, see Overseas Private Investment Corp., Overview, http://www.opic.gov/about-us (last visited Mar. 
8, 2010).
3 See DAC Glossary, supra note 1. 
4 See OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, http://www.oecd.org/dac (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
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countries.  Foreign assistance from private sources is estimated to have reached $49 
billion in 20075—just short of half of its official counterpart, which stood at nearly $105 
billion.  In some areas, private aid for development is approaching the level of bilateral 
official development assistance.6
Private international finance for individual and small business recipients seeking 
to improve development outcomes is particularly in vogue, and a bewildering variety of 
intermediaries have emerged to channel the growing capital flows.7  Some of these 
intermediaries work much like conventional charities, collecting and transmitting private 
donations for private recipients advancing development.8  Others work like conventional 
financial institutions, where creditors expect to get their money back and a return on their 
investment.9  However, some of the new intermediaries operate in a less well-defined 
space that lies somewhere between the traditional domains of charities and financial 
institutions.  Many of these collect funds from individual members of the general public 
in high-income countries for ultimate transfer to individuals in poor and middle-income 
countries, but neither as pure donations nor as market-rate investments.  
Mapping the space occupied by these new “peer-to-peer” intermediaries is 
difficult: it spans multiple jurisdictions and governance regimes and embraces a vast and 
growing variety of legal forms.  Here are some examples: 
 Kiva is a U.S. charity that solicits funds primarily from individual lenders through 
its website by posting portraits of micro-entrepreneurs around the world seeking 
credit.  The entrepreneurs are selected by a microfinance institution (MFI) with 
5 Heidi Metcalf, The Role of Private Actors in Development, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. ___, [5] (2010). 
6 See HOMI KHARAS, THE NEW REALITY OF AID 10 (2007), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08aid_kharas/08aid_kharas.pdf. 
7 See generally A Place in Society: Financial innovation and the poor, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 2009. 
8 For example, the Grameen Foundation solicits donations used to fund microfinance institutions in 
developing countries.  See Grameen Foundation, Take Action, http://www.grameenfoundation.org/take-
action (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) (“Your donation will support local microfinance institutions.”). 
9  Examples include the investment funds listed as members of the Council of Microfinance Equity Funds.   
CMEF – Membership, http://www.cmef.com/Page.aspx?pid=1747, (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).  Another 
example is MicroPlace, Inc., an eBay company and an SEC-registered broker-dealer that offers investors an 
opportunity to earn between 1 percent and 6 percent returns on investments in the microfinance industry.  
See MicroPlace, https://www.microplace.com/learn_more/howitworks (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
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which Kiva has established a relationship in the entrepreneur’s country.  Kiva’s 
online lenders designate an entrepreneur whom they wish to support and then lend 
money to Kiva, interest-free, for that purpose.  Kiva in turn lends the money to the 
MFI, also interest-free.  The MFI lends funds to the entrepreneur at market 
rates—usually without waiting to receive funds from Kiva; collects payments 
from the entrepreneur; and remits the principal repayments to Kiva.  The online 
lender’s account with Kiva is credited as Kiva is repaid by the MFI.10
 MYC4 is a Danish for-profit company that operates an online lending platform 
matching lenders with small and medium-sized business borrowers in Africa.  The 
prospective borrowers are identified by a local organization with which MYC4 
has a relationship.  Prospective borrowers upload information on their projects, 
the size of the loan requested, and the maximum interest rate they are willing to 
pay.  Prospective lenders first transfer money to an account with MYC4, then bid 
in a Dutch auction to lend to specific borrowers.  The winning bids demand the 
lowest interest rates, provided that their combined loan amount satisfies the 
borrower’s request and their average interest rate is below the maximum specified 
by the borrower.  MYC4 disburses the loan in local currency via a local 
intermediary (which may or may not be the entity that identified the borrower).  
The borrower repays the loan at an interest rate equal to a weighted average of the 
interest rates specified in the winning bids, plus fees for MYC4 and its partners.  
Each winning bidder is repaid principal plus interest at the rate it had bid; 
investors bear any currency risk.11
 DhanaX is an Indian for-profit company that operates an online lending platform 
matching lenders, who must be either resident or non-resident Indians, with 
prospective individual borrowers in India.  The borrowers must organize 
themselves into “self-help groups” that guarantee their members’ obligations to 
DhanaX.  DhanaX collects repayments monthly “from their [borrowers’] 
doorsteps” and remits them to the lenders’ accounts.  Unlike Kiva and MYC4, 
10 See http://www.kiva.org/about/how (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).  For an example of a for-profit firm—
which has, however, pledged to operate as a ‘social enterprise’—offering similar services, see Babyloan, 
http://www.babyloan.org/Default.aspx?lng=en (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
11 See MYC4, http://www.myc4.com/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
5
DhanaX guarantees the borrowers’ obligations.  The borrowers pay an interest 
rate of 24 percent; DhanaX pays the lenders an interest rate of 14 percent.12
 The Calvert Foundation is a U.S. charity that issues fixed-interest-rate unsecured 
notes to individuals and institutional investors.  The notes are sold directly by the 
Foundation, through registered brokers, and online through MicroPlace, Inc. (an 
eBay affiliate).  Calvert applies the proceeds to below-market loans to nonprofits 
engaged in community development and other social enterprises in and outside 
the United States.  Noteholders who purchase online must designate a particular 
enterprise as their investment target.  Interest rates on the notes vary depending on 
the enterprise designated, but, according to Calvert, they range substantially 
below the rates investors could obtain on purely commercial investments.13
 Acumen Fund is a U.S. charity that uses the proceeds from donations to make 
investments in enterprises, both for-profit and nonprofit, that have the potential 
for “significant social impact.”  The investments take a variety of forms, including 
both debt and equity, and range in size from $300,000 to $2,500,000.  Investment 
targets are enterprises in developing countries, and firms in the United States and 
the United Kingdom that work in developing countries.14
In each of these examples, the intermediary explicitly styles itself as a provider of 
financial services, stressing its efforts to reach the millions of “unbanked” and otherwise 
underserved by mainstream finance, one recipient at a time.  All promise the psychic 
returns of doing good.  But in no case is the bundle of products and services offered by 
the intermediaries limited to psychic returns alone.  All of them also emphasize their 
capacity to generate financial returns; all except Acumen undertake to repay their funders 
at least their initial advance.  Such promises of repayment are in addition to and distinct 
from the promise to do good. 
12 See DhanaX FAQs Page, https://www.dhanax.com/FAQs/about, (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
13 See CALVERT SOC. INV. FOUND., PROSPECTUS 3 (2009), available at:
http://www.calvertfoundation.org/downloads/prospectus/Prospectus.pdf. 
14 See Acumen Fund, Investment Discipline, http://www.acumenfund.org/investments/investment-
discipline.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
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So far the amount of money flowing through peer-to-peer intermediaries is 
relatively small.  In November 2008, Kiva, perhaps the highest profile of the 
intermediaries listed above, had lent a total of just $50 million over three years of 
operation.15  But the sector is also growing rapidly—by November 2009 Kiva’s 
cumulative lending topped $100 million.16  The sector is also evolving rapidly; it is not 
far-fetched to expect intermediaries to offer peer-to-peer products with redemption rights 
that make them as liquid as mutual funds, or guaranteed returns that make them look like 
certificates of deposit.  On the current trajectory, the $100 million trickle of funds 
flowing through Kiva in $100 increments soon may become a multi-billion dollar stream 
flowing through the new intermediaries.  The trend holds immense promise.  To the 
general public, the new investment options could look like development-friendly 
alternatives to mutual fund investing—a diversification opportunity.  For recipients and 
policy makers, there is the possibility of new sources and more funding for development, 
and mobilizing entrepreneurial innovation to achieve better development outcomes.  
Governments should encourage peer-to-peer development finance for its far-
reaching potential.  But this very reach has regulatory consequences:  new actors and 
products emerge in a thicket of overlapping private and public interests implicated in 
economic development, foreign assistance, charity, and consumer finance.  Each of these 
fields is heavily regulated, but in very different ways.    Grouping peer-to-peer finance 
with one field or another could subject it to radically different kinds of regulation, 
potentially affecting the policy outcomes.  For as long as the aggregate amounts involved 
are small and the impact is limited, this may not matter.  But if the objective is to 
mainstream peer-to-peer transfers in foreign assistance and consumer finance, the 
question of regulation is unavoidable—even if the ultimate choice is to exempt them 
altogether.
Regulating peer-to-peer intermediaries poses important new challenges for 
government authorities, the financial industry, and the broader civil society.  The 
15 Kiva, History, http://www.kiva.org/about/history (last visited Apr. 12, 2010). 
16 About Kiva, http://www.kiva.org/about/facts (last visited Apr. 12, 2010). 
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emergence of new vehicles for delivering financing to inhabitants of developing countries 
is part of the fragmentation and realignment of the institutional landscape of foreign aid.17
Accordingly, regulating the intermediaries is part of the ongoing challenge of devising 
governance structures that will “make aid work.”18  At the same time, the emergence of 
new actors should be seen as part of ongoing changes in the international financial 
system, which demand regulatory adjustment.  Regulating peer-to-peer intermediaries 
involves all of the challenges inherent in regulating other forms of international finance, 
namely, promoting financial inclusion through innovation while simultaneously ensuring 
the safety and soundness of financial institutions, protecting consumers of financial 
services, and minimizing systemic risk, all the while taking into account the economic 
and foreign policy concerns of investors’ home states as well as the macro-economic and 
development objectives of investment host states.  Devising an appropriate regulatory 
framework is particularly difficult once we have taken into account the sector’s 
tremendous potential for growth.  Optimal regulation for today’s peer-to-peer vehicles 
may be ill-suited for the development-friendly money-market fund of the future. 
In this article we offer a critical examination of the regime that governs peer-to-
peer intermediaries located in the United States.  The U.S. regime merits particular 
attention because of the relative size of the industry it governs: in 2007 the United States 
accounted for $36.9 billion of private foreign aid flows, compared to $12.2 billion in 
private foreign aid from other OECD countries and $21.8 billion in U.S. ODA.19
The U.S. regime comprises both charities law and the law governing financial 
institutions and markets, sometimes operating in conjunction with one another, other 
times as alternatives.  We find that neither body of law is up to the challenge of 
regulating the new peer-to-peer intermediaries.  U.S. charities law is unsuitable for both 
substantive and structural reasons.  The regime that governs cross-border activities of 
conventional financial institutions can be burdensome even as it falls short of core policy 
17 See Jean-Michel Severino & Olivier Ray, The End of ODA:  Death and Rebirth of a Global Public 
Policy, 10-11 (Center for Global Development, Working Paper No. 167, 2009) available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/files/1421419_file_End_of_ODA_FINAL.pdf.   
18 See Kharas, supra note 6, at ___; Severino & Ray, supra note 17, at 11-15. 
19 Metcalf, supra note 5, at ___ [p.4].  
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goals.  At best, applying traditional regulatory tools to these new actors produces 
disjointed regulation that keys off formal commonalities with traditional charitable giving 
or securities investment, but not the substance of their combination, nor the social and 
economic goals of development assistance.  Perhaps more importantly, we find no 
principled arguments and very little information to support classifying peer-to-peer 
vehicles either as charities or conventional financial institutions.  Choosing one over the 
other requires assuming away either charitable intent or the promise to repay. 
And yet we do not argue for a distinct regulatory regime to govern the activities 
of peer-to-peer intermediaries.  This position stems from our belief that the challenge 
these intermediaries present to policymakers is part of the broader challenge of making 
complex and global finance serve the needs of individuals, including the most vulnerable; 
of earning and keeping popular trust in finance;20 and safeguarding national and global 
financial systems from mass meltdowns.  It is of a piece with regulating mortgages, credit 
cards, securitization, and derivative products—but also shares the welfare goals of 
consumer protection regulation and development aid coordination.  The task of 
mainstreaming the new intermediaries proceeds in tandem with adapting financial 
regulation.  We therefore situate the new arrivals in the broader financial regulatory 
framework, and propose ways to reconcile the needs of their multiple constituents:  
donors, recipients, governments, and national and global financial systems.21
The next Part of this article describes the new forms of international finance in 
functional terms and by way of comparison to traditional charities and financial 
institutions.  Part III sets out the concerns that typically justify regulation of peer-to-peer 
intermediaries.  Part IV describes the regulatory frameworks that govern charities and 
financial institutions.  Part V sets out our recommendations. 
20 See, e.g., Robert Shiller, In Defence of Financial Innovation, FT.COM, Sep. 27, 2009, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4a74ba2-ab83-11de-9be4-00144feabdc0.html?SID=google (arguing that 
individuals can benefit from complex financial products, but (reasonably) do not trust the financial system 
enough to use them).  
21 For a general argument in favor of treating all international financial flows aimed at developing 
countries as a single object of study, see Kevin E. Davis, ‘Financing Development’ as a Field of Practice, 
Study and Innovation, in ACTA JURIDICA 168 (2009).
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II. Old and new categories of international finance 
A. What do charities do? 
First, a definitional point.  When we refer to charities we are referring to entities 
described in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code in the United States, and which 
enjoy special tax privileges because their activities advance one or more charitable 
purposes.  Those privileges take several forms.  Like many other nonprofit organizations, 
charities are exempt from federal taxation on their income22 and receive preferential 
treatment under other provisions of federal, state, and local tax laws.23  Perhaps even 
more importantly, contributions of cash or property to certain charities are deductible for 
the purposes of calculating the donor’s income, estate, and gift taxes.24  Charities that are 
eligible to receive tax deductible donations have a great advantage over other kinds of 
organizations in attracting funds. 
Traditionally, charities serve as intermediaries between donors and beneficiaries.  
Donors transfer money or other assets to the charity, which in turn transfers them to or 
for the benefit of needy individuals or socially useful causes.  The charity typically 
assumes only minimal financial obligations to donors and is owed only minimal financial 
obligations by beneficiaries.  In other words, so long as the charity disburses the funds 
more or less as specified by the donor, it owes the donor no financial obligation.  
Similarly, so long as the recipient uses the funds as specified by the charity, it owes no 
financial obligations to the charity. 
There are multiple benefits of using charitable organizations as intermediaries, as 
opposed to relying exclusively upon either direct giving by individuals or intermediation 
by government agencies—which is essentially what happens when tax receipts are used 
22 Internal Revenue Code [I.R.C.], 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
23 See generally John G. Simon, Harvey P. Dale & Laura B. Chisholm, The Federal Tax Treatment of 
Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (Walter W. Powell & 
Richard Steinberg, eds., 2d ed. 2006); PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE
BATTLEFIELD (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002). 
24 26 U.S.C. §§ 170 (income tax), 2055 (estate tax), 2522 (gift tax). 
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to support government-sponsored social programs.  These benefits run both to the private 
donors and beneficiaries, as well as to the governments.  First, an intermediary can 
aggregate donations from a number of donors, thereby achieving economies of scale and 
scope, and a level of coordination unattainable to most individual donors.  Second, it is 
easier to monitor the use and any abuse of any tax subsidy by a small number of 
intermediaries than by scores of individual donors.  To facilitate such monitoring, 
governments may prescribe the manner of charitable organization, activities, and 
reporting requirements.  Third, as compared to its donors, and perhaps a government 
agency as well, the charity has superior information, expertise, and administrative 
capacity.25  Fourth, competition between governments and charitable organizations 
encourages experimentation and helps foster altruism.26
B. What do financial institutions do? 
Financial institutions can also function as intermediaries, but of a different sort.  
Two basic forms are key to our discussion:  banks and investment companies.27  A 
traditional bank receives funds from individual and business depositors, and in return 
25 See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 570-71 (1990) (noting the 
advantages of vertical and horizontal integration for altruistic donors). 
26 See, e.g., BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS §1.4 (9th ed. 2007) (describing 
a “political philosophy rationale” for exempting charities from taxation in the United States, with roots in 
the writings of John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville, among others); Atkinson, supra note 25, at 600-
38 (describing alternative justifications for the tax exempt treatment of charities and emphasizing the 
benefits of promoting altruism). 
27 Two other forms of intermediation are beyond the scope of this article: insurance and dealing in 
derivatives.  Peer-to-peer intermediaries could conceivably offer versions of either of these financial 
products.  Imagine an intermediary that allows individual investors an opportunity to provide business 
interruption insurance—or any other kind of insurance for that matter—to entrepreneurs of their choosing.  
Alternatively, imagine a firm that offers investors opportunities to collect fixed returns in exchange for 
taking on obligations to make payouts to selected farmers in the event that grain prices in a region—or 
rainfall levels—fall below a preset level.  Under a long-standing political compromise embodied in the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 (15 U.S.C. §1011 et seq.), U.S. insurance regulation is overwhelmingly 
the province of individual states, coordinated through the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (www.naic.org).  Meanwhile, at the time of writing transactions involving derivatives 
contracts  are governed by the securities laws as well as the Commodities Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. § 1 
(2006) but the regime is undergoing profound change.  We choose not to explore these topics here for 
practical reasons.  None of the institutions we have studied offer peer-to-peer insurance or derivatives.  
Their current activities have little in common with insurance or derivatives dealing.  Thus  it would be 
difficult to justify the rather involved legal analysis that would be necessary to examine the topics fully.  
Moreover, given the uncertainty surrounding U.S. regulation of derivatives our analysis of that topic would 
necessarily be highly speculative. 
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assumes obligations to repay those funds on demand or at the end of a specified term.  
Depositors may or may not earn a competitive market return, since regulations may 
constrain banks’ capacity to pay interest on deposits.  In most cases, having an account 
entitles depositors to a bundle of transactional services, such as check-writing and money 
transfers, in addition to getting their money back.  When it receives a deposit, the bank 
turns around and lends the funds to other individuals or firms, who in return assume 
various obligations to the bank, chief among them the obligation to repay.  A bank thus 
combines features of a pooled investment vehicle with the basic utility of giving its 
depositors a secure means to hold and transfer money.  Unlike charities and most other 
financial institutions, banks intermediate credit risk, and transform liquid deposits into 
long-term loans. 
Investment companies, or investment funds, facilitate pooled investment in 
securities under third-party management.  Such vehicles originated in Great Britain in the 
19th century, partly in response to the scale and information challenges inherent in 
private financing of colonial enterprises.  Investment companies issue common stock, and 
occasionally other securities, to investors.  They use the proceeds to buy diversified 
portfolios of securities, and contract with investment advisers to manage their assets in 
line with the investment goals approved by their shareholders.  Depending on how a fund 
is organized, an investor may redeem her shares either on demand, or at the end of a 
specified term, and receive the net asset value represented by her holdings.  Unlike banks, 
which bear the credit risk of their loan portfolios, investment funds do not guarantee the 
value of their investors’ claims.  Thus if a bank loan defaults, the bank’s obligation to its 
depositor is unchanged.  If a bond held by an investment fund defaults, the total value of 
fund assets goes down, and so does the value of the investor’s claim against the fund.   
Some investment funds, notably money market mutual funds, offer transactional services 
such as check-writing. 
A third category of financial institutions—comprising brokers (agents who buy 
and sell securities for their customers’ accounts), dealers (who buy and sell securities for 
their own account), and investment advisers (who advise clients on securities 
12
investing)—is less relevant to our discussion.  Broker-dealers offer expertise and have 
corresponding duties to their customers, but do not pool customer funds; instead of 
intermediating, they facilitate direct investing.  Most of the new peer-to-peer 
intermediaries we discuss do not enable providers of funds to obtain direct claims against 
the ultimate recipients of funds and so do not play roles analogous to those of broker-
dealers or investment advisers.28
In at least two respects, individuals derive benefits from using banks and 
investment funds that are comparable to the benefits of using charities as intermediaries 
for donations.  First, the financial institution aggregates funds from a large number of 
depositors or investors.  This allows people to access larger and more diversified 
investments than they would without pooling.  Second, financial institutions match 
providers and recipients of funds.  Not many depositors or investors can access the 
information required to identify the full range of potential targets, the expertise to 
evaluate the risks associated with lending to them, or the capacity to administer a 
portfolio that may include claims against large numbers of funding recipients.29  Apart 
from such pooling and information services, traditional financial institutions and 
traditional charities offer different benefits.  Where banks and investment funds offer 
financial returns, transactional services, and varying measures of liquidity, charities 
promise social benefits and psychic satisfaction. 
C. The new peer-to-peer intermediaries 
Some of the new peer-to-peer intermediaries perform some of the same functions 
as banks or investment funds.  Take, for example, Kiva.  It receives funds from investors, 
and in return assumes a conditional obligation to repay those funds (albeit without 
interest).  Kiva then turns around and lends the funds it receives to a microfinance 
institution—typically in a low-income country, but sometimes in the United States—
28 Some of the intermediaries may issue securities through broker-dealers or be recommended by 
investment advisers.  See, e.g., Microplace.com, supra note 9. 
29 Individuals can invest in securities directly in the United States if the issuer has complied with the 
registration and reporting requirements under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934.  
Even so, most do not enjoy the liquidity and information advantages of institutional investors. 
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which in turn lends the money to a local enterprise.  To the extent it identifies potential 
recipients and aggregates loans from multiple funders to meet recipients’ needs, Kiva 
performs the information and pooling functions of traditional intermediaries.   As with 
investment funds, investors’ returns depend on recipients’ or guarantors’ payment 
performance.   However, unlike a traditional investment fund Kiva does not automatically 
provide diversification for investors.  Unlike banks, Kiva  does not intermediate credit 
risk (although some of its partner MFIs choose to  guarantee their clients’ repayment) and 
it does not transform maturities:  generally, investors fund the full term of the recipients’ 
loans (an average of just over ten months).30  On the other hand, by holding accounts for 
their lenders, from which they can either withdraw money using Paypal or fund new Kiva 
loans, Kiva provides limited transactional services.31
In addition to such distinctions, there are two fundamental differences between 
peer-to-peer intermediaries and conventional banks or investment funds.  First, the 
obligations the intermediary assumes to its investors need not involve paying a market 
rate of return or serving as a full-blown transactional services utility.  Second, the 
ultimate recipients of funding from these intermediaries are, in the first instance, selected 
because funding them is deemed to serve some socially useful purpose that presumably 
also yields psychic satisfaction for the provider of funds.  Creditworthiness alone, in the 
traditional sense, may be necessary but is not sufficient.  Both these features are, of 
course, more characteristic of organized charity than traditional financial institutions.  
Thus the new intermediaries combine aspects of charity, banking, and investment fund 
operation.
There are no authoritative studies establishing why this mix of financial and non-
financial returns appeals to providers of funds.  The peer-to-peer model may satisfy 
visceral desires to establish a direct connection with beneficiaries and to exert a measure 
of control over the use of one’s money.  But peer-to-peer intermediaries may offer only 
30 The Microfinance Gateway, Open Up Your Virtual Wallet, 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m/template.rc/1.26.9154/ (last visited May 9, 2010). 
31 Knowledge@Wharton, When Small Loans Make a Big Difference, FORBES.COM, June 3, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/06/03/kiva-microfinance-uganda-ent-fin-cx_0603whartonkiva.html (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2010). 
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the illusion of a direct connection and control because in many cases the entrepreneurs 
whose pictures they use to solicit funds have already received financing, and do not know 
its ultimate source.32  It also remains unclear why funders prefer to receive a below-
market rate of return on their investment over making a pure grant or insisting on a 
market rate of return.  Some donors may believe that lending—even lending with a large 
effective grant element (very long-term and interest-free)—instills discipline in the 
borrowers with the obligation to repay, or is more dignified and less condescending to the 
beneficiaries.  Other donors may choose to lend rather than give away their money 
because they cannot afford to give away the marginal dollar, but can muster a smaller 
subsidy inherent in an interest-free or low-interest loan.  Yet others may either not 
understand the terms of their financing, or may not care about them.  In June 2008 Matt 
Flannery, one of Kiva’s co-founders, observed that many Kiva lenders were carrying 
balances in their Kiva accounts.  Flannery is reported as saying, “We have a challenge 
right now, because the people who are getting paid back aren’t reloaning. . . .  They are 
just keeping the money in their [Kiva] account.  Maybe they didn't know it was a loan.  
Maybe they thought it was a donation.  So we have about $3 million right now in the 
bank just getting float.”33
III.   Regulatory concerns 
Financial intermediation is a socially valuable activity.  The potential benefits 
flow not only to the providers and recipients of funds, but also to the communities in 
which they live and the larger economies of which they are part.  International peer-to-
peer intermediaries are a case in point.  Their business models enhance the appeal of 
development finance to both funders and recipients and so have the potential to increase 
the aggregate amount of money flowing to socially valuable projects in developing 
countries.  Moreover, innovations introduced by peer-to-peer intermediaries, such as 
market-based selection and community feedback mechanisms, may improve the quality 
32 David Roodman, Kiva Is Not Quite What It Seems, Microfinance Open Book Blog, Oct. 2, 2009, 
http://blogs.cgdev.org/open_book/2009/10/kiva-is-not-quite-what-it-seems.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). 
33 Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 30. 
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of existing projects, or even inspire new projects, and thus lead to better development 
outcomes.34  For all these reasons, encouraging new forms of intermediation is a 
legitimate policy objective.   
At the same time, as the recent financial crisis has amply demonstrated, financial 
intermediation is an inherently risky activityespecially when it crosses national 
bordersand innovative forms of intermediation can have hidden dangers.  From the 
perspective of the person providing the funds, there are concerns that the intermediary 
may misuse their funds or misrepresent the riskiness of their investment, resulting in 
unexpected loss.35  Similarly, at the other end of the transactional chain, recipients may 
worry that the intermediaries will abscond with the funds and, in the worst case scenario, 
leave them with the repayment obligation.  Recipients may also worry about being 
subject to unduly onerous obligations imposed on them by the intermediaries.36  Because 
cross-border financial flows can have significant impacts on constituencies apart from the 
contracting parties, the jurisdictions in which all of the funders (the home state), the 
recipients (the host state), and the intermediaries (the intermediary’s state) are located, or, 
in the extreme, any jurisdiction with an interest in the security and stability of the 
international financial system, have an interest in regulating international financial 
intermediation.  Regulators’ failures to respond to innovative ways of connecting savers 
and users of funds such as, most recently, large-scale asset securitization, can lead to 
misallocation of finance, credit and asset price bubbles, and eventually, financial crises.  
In the remainder of this section we take up each of these regulatory concerns in turn. 
 Our overarching contention is that the new intermediaries are financial institutions 
offering financial services and products to the retail public, often in multiple jurisdictions, 
and, given the risks inherent in such transactions, should be presumptively regulated as 
34 See Devesh Kapur & Dennis Whittle, Can The Privatization of Foreign Aid Enhance Accountability? 42 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. ____ (2010).
35 For sobering stories of funds channeled through peer-to-peer intermediaries that were misappropriated by 
home country intermediaries, see Matt Flannery, Kiva at Four, INNOVATIONS (SPECIAL EDITION FOR SKOLL 
WORLD FORUM 2009), at 29, 32-36 (2009). 
36 Brokers, dealers, and advisers can have a similar impact indirectly, when they condition their willingness 
to buy or recommend investments. 
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such.37  The funders of some of these intermediaries may have altruistic motivations, and 
some of the intermediaries may also be appropriately classified as charities.  In such 
cases, charities regulation may fill in gaps left by financial regulation.  But the presence 
of charitable motives alone should not preclude financial regulation. 
A. Interests of donors, depositors, and investors 
 A central regulatory concern is with protecting the expectations of people who 
provide funds to financial intermediaries.  Those expectations pertain to how their funds 
will be used, financial returns and services provided by the intermediary, and the risk that 
such expectations will be disappointed.  Naturally, providers’ expectations can vary 
considerably.  Some people want their funds deployed to support very specific projects, 
which they expect to have very specific financial and social outcomes.  Others are less 
interested in precisely how their funds will be used than in what the intermediary will 
provide in return, such as a particular level of liquidity, particular social outcomes, or a 
particular financial rate of return.  Finally, providers of funds can have widely varying 
levels of tolerance for risk that their expectations, financial or otherwise, will be 
disappointed.
The threshold concern, then, is that providers of funds understand the terms of 
their financing and the risks they are taking on.  For example, do they have a direct claim 
on the ultimate borrower, the MFI, or the intermediary?  What are the legal and financial 
relationships among the three, and how does the creditworthiness of each determine the 
funders’ chances of getting their money back?38  These are hard questions.  Because so 
many of the peer-to-peer funders are middle-income individuals who are not necessarily 
37 Cf. In re Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8984, 2008 SEC LEXIS 2791 (Nov. 24, 
2008).  In this Cease and Desist Order entered against an online peer-to-peer loan broker, the SEC observed 
that “[w]hile some Prosper lenders may be motivated, in part, by altruism, altruistic and profit motives are 
not mutually exclusive.” Id. at *11. 
38 See, e.g., DANIEL ROZAS, THROWING IN THE TOWEL: LESSONS FROM MFI LIQUIDATIONS (2009), 
available at http://www.microfinancefocus.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Throwing-in-the-
Towel.pdf (suggesting that MFI liquidations to date have resulted in limited or no recovery for investors, 
often without regard to the ultimate borrowers’ capacity to repay).  See also Roodman, supra note 31 
(suggesting that Kiva’s description of its lending process may mislead some lenders).  
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sophisticated investors,39 regulators cannot take for granted their capacity to manage the 
risks inherent in their foray into development finance. 
The regulatory challenge is most significant when intermediaries are given broad 
discretion over the use of funds.  This is a rational response to the combined effects of 
imperfect information and transaction costs—it is often difficult to predict the future 
course of events and prohibitively costly either to specify in advance how funds should 
be used in every possible contingency or to seek the provider’s consent each time a 
decision has to be made about the use of funds.  But the broader the discretion the 
intermediary has, the greater the need for regulation to ensure that its managers behave in 
a manner consistent with the interests and expectations of those who have provided 
capital.  In practical terms, this means that the case for intrusive regulation of true 
intermediaries, such as deposit-taking banks and money market funds, is stronger than the 
case for regulating brokers with limited authority to invest on clients’ behalf or 
“middlemen” such as wire transfer services. 
Some of the risks associated with giving a financial intermediary broad discretion 
are inherent in principal-agent relationships.  There is always the danger that the 
intermediary—or at least critical agents or employees—either will be incompetent or will 
have interests that conflict with those of the providers of capital.  These kinds of 
“managerial agency costs” can lead to either waste, in the case of incompetence, 
misappropriation of funds, or “mission drift,” where the funds may be used productively 
but not in the manner intended by the providers. 
The risks associated with financial intermediaries are also affected to some extent 
by their capital structure, and the roles that holders of various sorts of claims against the 
intermediaries’ assets play in its governance.  A critical issue is the role of residual 
claimants, such as equity holders.  On the one hand, residual claimants, by definition, 
39 Kharas, supra note 6, at 9-10.  Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the 
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025 (2009) (exploring the implications of the 
shift to institutional investors in the public securities markets for a regulatory system designed to protect 
individual investors). 
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have a financial interest in maximizing the economic value of the firm.  On the other 
hand, where the firm’s assets are insufficient to pay residual claimants, they have nothing 
to lose and much to gain from risky ventures—or gambling at the expense of more senior 
fixed claimants.40  Residual claimants are the object of regulation in both charities and 
financial institutions:  charities are defined by their prohibition on residual claims, 
eliminating the potential conflict of interest with donors.41  In banks by contrast, residual 
claimants provide capital on terms narrowly specified by regulators to discourage 
excessive risk taking at the expense of depositors or the deposit insurance fund.  These 
tensions between the advantages and disadvantages of residual claimants are reflected in 
ongoing debates about whether microfinance institutions should be organized as for-
profits or nonprofits—i.e., with or without residual claimants.42
Funders should also care about the levels of fragmentation or complexity of the 
intermediary’s capital structure.  The benefits of fragmentation and complexity are the 
benefits of aggregating capital from a large number or disparate set of sources.  The 
potential costs are the collective action problems that might inhibit coordinated 
monitoring of the intermediary’s operations or collective decision-making at critical 
junctures, such as when some sort of financial restructuring is required.43  Thus large 
40 For instance, when the firm is on the borderline of being able to satisfy the fixed claims against its assets, 
residual claimants bear a relatively small share of the downside risk associated with risky assets (the 
remaining risk is borne by fixed claimants) and most of the upside benefit.  Consequently the residual 
claimants have a greater incentive to roll the dice than do the fixed claimants.  On other hand, as the firm’s 
fortunes decline and it becomes increasingly clear that the value of the intermediary’s assets will not 
exceed the amount required to satisfy fixed claims, the residual claimants have little incentive to invest 
additional time or money in the firm, even if doing so would benefit the fixed claimants.   For a general 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of different ownership structures for financial institutions, 
see HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 246-64 (1996). 
41 See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980) (explaining 
adoption of the nonprofit form as a response to potential conflict of interest between patrons of nonprofits 
and their managers); HANSMANN, supra note 39, at 227-45 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of 
nonprofit organizational form). 
42 See, e.g., BEATRIZ ARMENDÁRIZ & JONATHAN MORDUCH, THE ECONOMICS OF MICROFINANCE 279-80
(2005) (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of commercializing microlenders); Kate Lauer, 
Transforming NGO MFIs: Critical Ownership Issues to Consider (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
[CGAP] Occasional Paper No. 13, 2008), available at http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-
1.9.4213/OP13.pdf (discussing legal and financial issues stemming from the transformation of 
microfinance institutions into for-profit lenders). 
43 See HANSMANN, supra note 39, at 39-45 (discussing the costs associated with collective decision 
making). 
19
banks with many small depositors, or charities with many small donors perform very 
valuable services, but they also pose distinctive regulatory challenges. 
B. Interests of the public in the home state
Peer-to-peer international financing is not a wholly private affair, even if all the 
immediate parties to the transaction chain are private actors.  There are several reasons to 
believe that broader public interests are affected by these sorts of transactions.  We begin 
with the interests of the general population in the funders’ home country. 
At the most basic level, private funds deployed in line with the home country’s 
foreign assistance goals increase the total resources available to advance such goals.44
For this reason the home country has an interest in documenting and publicizing cross-
border financial assistance provided by its residents.  Countries earn reputational benefits 
from being recognized for their generosity, and public shame for being stingy with aid.45
It seems plausible to assume that the generosity of individual residents of a country 
reflects well on the country as a whole, and enhances the moral stature of that country as 
evidence that it is bearing its fair share of global redistribution.  Generosity can engender 
goodwill abroad, and is a valuable part of the “soft power” arsenal.46  These 
considerations probably go a long way toward explaining why the United States takes 
great pains to point out that when individual and corporate philanthropy are taken into 
44 Andrew Natsios, USAID Administrator, Remarks at the InterAction Forum (May 21, 2003), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2003/sp030521.html (describing the policy significance of NGO 
work as USAID contractors, as well as private aid flows and independent NGO activity in the context of 
the U.S. anti-terrorism efforts).  For an overview of the debate regarding the neutrality of US NGOs, see 
Abby Stoddard, With Us or Against Us?, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, Dec. 2003, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/176/31482.html. 
45 This is the premise behind initiatives such as the Commitment to Development Index, which “rates 22 
rich countries on how much they help poor countries build prosperity, good government, and security.”  
Ctr. for Global Development, Commitment to Development Index 2009 
http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/ (last visited  Apr. 4, 2010). 
46 The term describes “the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your 
goals. It differs from hard power, the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to 
make others follow your will.” Joseph S. Nye, Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Jan. 10, 2003, at 6, 6. 
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account, Americans are much more generous to the developing world than is suggested 
by official development assistance statistics.47
For similar policy reasons, the home country can have an interest in controlling 
the destinations of private actors’ cross-border financial transfers.  This is especially true 
when those private transfers are subsidized by public funds, as is the case when taxpayers 
are permitted to deduct charitable donations from their taxable income.  Democratic 
principles suggest that the public may agree to subsidize some cross-border transfers but 
not others.  A democratic state might legitimately conclude that the public interest lies in 
insisting that public funds be used to support projects that would otherwise have to be 
funded by the government, that generate public benefits, or are distributed in an efficient, 
fair and transparent fashion (although such a state may also have an interest in sponsoring 
dissenting views).48
To be sure, the public interest in controlling the allocation of private funds across 
borders does not arise only when there is a public subsidy.  A country clearly has an 
interest in discouraging private actors from providing financial support to its enemies and 
in encouraging the provision of financial support to its friends, whether or not that 
support is being publicly subsidized.  There is a public interest in restricting financial 
support to terrorists.  Similarly, there is a public interest in encouraging financial 
transfers to people who will reciprocate by helping to fight its wars, combating threats to 
the global environment, or—perhaps more controversially—upholding its values.49  All 
of these concerns are manifest in ongoing debates about the circumstances in which 
economic sanctions ought to be imposed,50 the extent to which subsidized credit should 
be provided to exporters,51 whether or not tax deductions ought to be provided for 
47 Metcalf, supra note 5, at ___ [1-2]; see also Carol Adelman, Global Philanthropy and Remittances:  
Reinventing Foreign Aid, BROWN J. WORLD AFF., Spring/Summer 2009, at 23, 23. 
48 David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531 (2006) (canvassing 
principles that ought to guide the provision of public subsidies for private cross-border charity). 
49 Natsios, supra note 43 (indicating that NGOs should give preference to working with governments that 
espouse democratic values). 
50 See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (3d ed. 2008).  
51 Janet Koven Levit, The Dynamics of International Trade Finance Law:  The Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credits, 45 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 65 (2004). 
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donations to foreign charity,52 and the conditions upon which bilateral aid ought to be 
provided.
C. Interests of recipients of funds 
 Recipients of funding in international peer-to-peer transfers are exposed to 
significant risks.  Some are due to agency and information problems similar to those 
summarized earlier in the discussion of funding providers: before the money is disbursed, 
would-be recipients are just another set of claimants on the intermediary.  Until they have 
the money in hand, recipients ought to be concerned about whether intermediaries will 
live up to commitments to provide funding, whether those commitments are explicit or 
implicit.  The more credible the commitments, the more prospective recipients are 
justified in relying on them to make productive investments.  Conversely, the absence of 
credible commitments of this sort can be destabilizing.  The absence of credible 
commitments to specific levels of funding is the fundamental source of complaints about 
the volatility of foreign aid flows.53  Similarly, host country intermediaries—such as the 
MFIs that deal with Kiva—and the ultimate recipients of funding are vulnerable to 
sudden fluctuations in the supply of capital from peer-to-peer intermediaries.54
Additional concerns arise when the intermediary attaches conditions and 
obligations to the funding.  The purpose of these conditions is generally to advance the 
goals of the funders and to prevent misuse of the funds by recipients; however, they may 
overreach, or pursue legitimate goals in problematic ways.  In that case a host of policy 
concerns, ranging from bounded rationality and asymmetric information to due process 
52 Harvey P. Dale, Foreign Charities, 48 TAX LAW. 655, 655 (1995); Joannie Chang et al., Cross-Border 
Charitable Giving, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 563, 601-12 (1997); Pozen, supra note 47, at 535. 
53 See generally Homi Kharas, Measuring the Cost of Aid Volatility (Wolfensohn Ctr. for Development, 
Working Paper No. 3, 2008) (measuring volatility of aid flows and estimating the costs based on data on 
pricing of risk in U.S. equity markets). 
54 Deborah Burand, Microfinance Managers Consider Online Funding:  Is It Finance, Marketing, or 
Something Else Entirely? (CGAP, Focus Note No. 54 ,2009); Flannery, supra note 34,at 31-32 (“MFIs 
come to expect a certain level of funding and plan their portfolio growth around it. If the funding they 
actually get differs significantly from their projections, they run the risk of having a liquidity crisis. 
Although this hasn’t yet happened to any of our partners, it is a real risk.”).  Flannery went on to explain 
that Kiva attempts to mitigate this risk by barring any partner MFI from funding more than 30 percent of its 
portfolio through Kiva.
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and protection of basic human rights, come into play.  For instance, do recipients 
understand the obligations they are assuming, particularly complex obligations, such as 
those involving foreign exchange risk?55  Are those obligations fair and reasonable?  Are 
they being enforced by threats of violence or other forms of abuse?  These kinds of 
concerns are more or less the same ones that have traditionally arisen in wholly domestic 
debates about predatory lending, loan-sharking, and abusive debt collection, as well as in 
more recent debates about whether borrowers lose privacy when their lenders raise funds 
from peer-to-peer intermediaries.56
D. Interests of the host state
 The public in the country of the recipient is affected by international peer-to-peer 
financing in ways that may not be apparent to the funders and their governments.  
Transfers that look minuscule from the donor perspective ($25 for an individual, $25 
million for a government) can transform the policy landscape in a $4 billion economy 
where most people live on $1 a day.57   Whether they displace or add to foreign 
assistance, private flows replicate, and occasionally exacerbate, the challenges of aid 
allocation and coordination, well-rehearsed in the government-to-government context.  
There is no guarantee that funders and host states will agree on policy priorities or the 
relative social benefits of alternative projects.  Nor is there any guarantee that the 
uncoordinated choices of disparate public and private actors will result in the socially 
optimal allocation of funds in the host economy where basic human needs go unmet.   
One clearly public interest in regulating inflows of capital stems from their 
macroeconomic effects.  For example, a spike in foreign exchange inflows may push up 
the value of the local currency and make local industries uncompetitive; more broadly, it 
can dramatically affect resource allocation among different sectors in the economy.58
55 Burand, supra note 53, at 2. 
56 Id. at 9. 
57 Malawi is an example of such an economy.  World Bank, Gross Domestic Product Ranking Table 
(2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf. 
58 For an overview of the policy debate on the macroeconomic impact of foreign aid flows and potential 
policy responses, see, for example, Alessandro Prati & Thierry Tressel, What is the Most Effective 
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Moreover, where funding recipients take on unsustainable debt burdens,59 the resulting 
financial distress can have social costs, including broader economic decline in the 
recipient’s locality, family breakdown, ill-health, and even suicide epidemics.60  And, if 
the benefits of external financing flow only to certain segments of the society, the 
resulting increase in inequality may cause social tensions and conflict. 
Yet another host state concern is specific to the financial sector.  To the extent 
that foreign intermediaries purport to fill the gap left by under-provision of financial 
services in the recipient’s country, they may do so in ways that either spur or displace the 
development of a local financial services industry.61  Thus the manner in which the 
foreign aid intermediary interfaces with the individual or small business recipient and the 
extent and manner of the intermediary’s recourse to local financial institutions, can be of 
great policy interest to host country authorities. 
Monetary Policy for Aid-Receiving Countries? (U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Working Paper No. 
12, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2006/wp12_2006.pdf (considering the 
macroeconomic implications of radically increasing donor country commitments for HIV/AIDS funding);
see also Raghuram Rajan & Arvind Subramanian, What Undermines Aid’s Impact on Growth? (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 05/126, 2005) (arguing that aid inflows can depress growth by making 
recipient country’s exports uncompetitive).  Because aid flows are highly volatile (often varying 10 to 30 
percent of the recipient country’s output from year to year), fluctuations in aid flows can bring highly 
destabilizing exchange rate fluctuations.  Prati & Tressel, supra, at 1.  The traditional policy response is 
sterilization, where the central bank effectively absorbs the foreign currency inflows on its balance sheet.  
Id. at 3. 
59 See, e.g., Ketaki Gokhale, A Global Surge in tiny Loans Spurs Credit Bubble in the Slum, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 13, 2009, at A1 (“[A]verage Indian household debt from microfinance lenders almost quintupled 
between 2004 and 2009, to about $135” per household).  While this sum is small by global standards, “in 
rural India, the poorest often subsist on just a few dollars a week.” Id.
60 See, e.g., Microsharks: Microcredit in India, ECONOMIST, Aug. 19, 2006,  available at
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7803631 (attributing suicides 
among poor women in India to improper lending practices among microfinance institutions undergoing 
“indiscriminate expansion”).  But see Zubair Ahmed, Indian Cotton Farmers Look to Micro Credit, BBC
NEWS, Jan. 31, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6297919.stm (citing microcredit as a source of 
sustainable refinancing and debt relief to address a suicide epidemic among Indian farmers over-indebted to 
traditional creditors).  The contrasting views of the social impact of microcredit illustrate the range of 
possible outcomes for the new intermediaries: they could promote sustainable lending or loan-sharking.  
Especially when the sector is growing fast, it can be hard to tell the difference. 
61 See, e.g., Todd Johnson, OPIC Equity Funds, in FOREIGN AID AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, 57, 
63 (Carol Lancaster, Kwaku Nuamah, Matthew Lieber & Todd Johnson, eds., 2006) (describing private 
equity investment by the International Finance Corporation with the goal of capacity building—“to 
modernize the financial sectors” in recipient countries—rather than just funding the recipient firms). 
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When foreign funders or intermediaries attempt to take host state public interests 
into account, members of the host state may disagree with their assessment of where the 
public interest lies.  Conflicts of this sort are reflected in the long-standing policy debate 
and academic literature on country “ownership” in development assistance,62 as well as 
studies on foreign aid allocation.63  For example, foreign actors may be more interested in 
funding projects evidenced by visible short-term outcomes such as buildings or dams, 
rather than intangible or long-range outcomes such as training teachers; or they may be 
interested in helping people with whom the donors share a language, culture, religion, or 
gender, rather than the most impoverished.  This is not a problem if other private or 
public funding is available for more pressing needs:  money is fungible, and having 
someone else pay for a dam can free up budget resources for teacher training.  But where 
there are no other sources of funds, host states can find the allocation of foreign funding 
wasteful and damaging.64
Finally, there is the simple lack of coordination. In a wealthy or even middle-
income country, private resource allocation may be the norm, with the government filling 
in the gaps.  But where the society relies on outside, largely public, funding to provide for 
basic human needs, there is a prima facie case for coordination by officials from the host 
country.65  For example, providers of funds with limited information may rationally 
62 See generally Andrew Mold, Policy Ownership and Aid Conditionality in the Light of the Financial 
Crisis:  A Critical Review (OECD Development Ctr. Studies, Working Paper No. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/47/0,3343,en_2649_33959_43775535_1_1_1_1,00.html (reviewing the 
debate and its current policy implications); see also Alberto Paloni & Maurizio Zanardi, Development 
Policy Lending, Conditionality, and Ownership:  A Dynamic Agency Model Perspective, 10 REV. DEV.
ECON. 253 (2006) (providing a theoretical argument for designing policy conditions on external funding to 
fit specific recipient country circumstances, including politics). 
63 See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, Who Gives Aid to Whom and Why?, 5 J. ECON. GROWTH 33 
(2000) (arguing that foreign assistance is allocated based on colonial ties and political alliances, rather than 
economic need and policy performance). 
64 See Kenneth Anderson, Microcredit:  Fulfilling or Belying the Universalist Morality of Globalizing 
Markets?, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85 (2002) (highlighting the ambivalent relationship between 
microcredit, market finance, and the global financial markets).  For an early study of private aid allocation, 
see Tim Buthe, Solomon Major, & Andre de Mello e Souza, The Politics of Private Development Aid:  
Serving Recipient Needs or Donor Interests? (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.duke.edu/~buthe/downloads/BMdMeS_PrivateAid_Nov09.pdf (providing an empirical study of 
large U.S. development NGOs and suggesting that they allocate funding based on recipient needs, such as 
poverty and quality of life, rather than the NGOs’ self-interest in domestic publicity or, for the most part, 
U.S. government priorities). 
65 Severino & Ray, supra note 17, at 6.   
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stampede to fashionable projects—such as ones most recently shown to be most 
effective.  The result may be an over-supply of capital for popular projects and neglect of 
others in dire need.  Capital inflows from private as opposed to public sources are 
particularly difficult to coordinate because their sources are often relatively diffuse.  It is 
one thing for the government of a developing country to sit down with five or ten official-
sector donors to coordinate funding for a coherent national development strategy; it is 
another thing to do the same with thousands of private online funders, or even their 
intermediaries. 
It bears emphasis that even if protecting the interests of inhabitants of the host 
state is accepted as a valid regulatory concern, it remains an open question whether in any 
given context private funders and their intermediaries or host country officials are best 
placed to safeguard those interests.  Private actors may be ill-informed or disorganized, 
but host country officials may be corrupt or inept, or simply overwhelmed.66   We believe 
that host states have legitimate interests in regulating peer-to-peer international finance, 
but we do not presume that they will always regulate effectively. 
E. Systemic concerns
The possibility of adverse systemic consequences from small-scale peer-to-peer 
loans initially seems far-fetched.  Such consequences arise when the failure of one or 
more financial institutions threatens to bring on a cascade of failures throughout the 
financial sector, with dire effects for the real economy.  Institutions that are capable of 
bringing on systemic collapse are usually large (for example, a dominant state-owned 
bank), interconnected with other parts of the financial system (for example, some 
investment funds and broker-dealers that serve as counterparties in complex webs of 
financial contracts), serve as a principal source of finance in a key sector of the economy, 
such as housing, or are likely to spur imitative runs.  Thus traditional banks, with their 
structural mismatch between long-term lending and demand deposits, links with all other 
66 The issue becomes even more complicated if one takes into account the possibility that assigning 
responsibility to host country governments will, over time, enhance their institutional capacity. 
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parts of the financial system and the real economy, and central role in the payment 
system, have been historically prone to panics and contagion that threaten the broader 
financial system.   
There are three reasons why the risk of system-wide repercussions from the 
failure or rapid withdrawal of an international peer-to-peer intermediary may not be as 
remote as it seems at first blush.  The first has to do with defining the relevant 
“system.”67  As noted earlier, private peer-to-peer financing may be concentrated in 
certain geographical areas or sectors, where it would trigger macroeconomic effects, 
including a significant impact on asset prices, inflation, and employment, which may 
reverberate far beyond the area of concentration.  Recent high-profile debates 
surrounding shantytowns “carpet-bombed” with microloans, and the limits on the 
microcredit absorptive capacity in parts of Latin America and South Asia, have prompted 
comparisons with the U.S. subprime crisis.68 Second, many peer-to-peer intermediaries 
are deeply connected with other parts of the financial system.  For example, 
intermediaries that mobilize ‘peer-to-peer’ funding for loans extended by host country 
financial institutions effectively serve as sources of asset-backed financing for such 
institutions, which in turn specialize in loan origination and servicing (identifying 
67 The definition of what constitutes the “system” in “systemic risk” varies considerably in the literature.  
See e.g., Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 Geo. L. J. __ (forthcoming 2010) [at 11], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1548787 (a current summary of the literature).  
Systemic risk and systemic crises can be regional, national or international.  A localized crisis with 
macroeconomic effects could be systemic.  Thus the U.S. savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, which was 
limited to thrift institutions and disproportionately affected the Southwest, may be fairly described as 
systemic. 
68 See Special Debate: Microfinance Credit Bubbles and Self-Regulation, MICROFINANCE FOCUS, Jan. 10, 
2010, http://www.microfinancefocus.com/news/2010/01/10/special-debate-microfinance-credit-bubbles-
and-self-regulation/ (discussing whether regulation of microfinance is an appropriate means of avoiding 
subprime-style crises); Daniel Rozas, Opinion:  Is There a Microfinance Bubble in South India?,
MICROFINANCE FOCUS, Nov. 17, 2009, http://www.microfinancefocus.com/news/2009/11/17/opinion-
microfinance-bubble-south-india/ (discussing the increasing potential for such a microfinance bubble); 
Gokhale, supra note 58 (drawing parallels between the rapid expansion of microcredit in India and the U.S. 
subprime market); Froth at the Bottom of the Pyramid, ECONOMIST.COM, Aug. 25, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/business-finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TQNJRJJG (citing counter-
arguments to the claims in Gokhale, but concluding on balance that localized microcredit bubbles are 
plausible even as the sector as a whole remains under-served); cf. ROBERT PECK CHRISTEN, TIMOTHY R.
LYMAN & RICHARD ROSENBERG, MICROFINANCE CONSENSUS GUIDELINES: GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON 
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF MICROFINANCE  13 (2003), available at 
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2787/Guideline_RegSup.pdf (noting the objective of protecting the 
financial system as a whole in applying prudential regulation to microfinance institutions).  
27
borrowers, providing initial advances, billing and collection).  Third, flows of new funds 
into peer-to-peer intermediaries are potentially volatile.  It is not difficult to imagine 
investors rapidly deserting an intermediary in the event of a scandal or the emergence of 
a new competitor.  A run in this context could be a wave of investors refusing to roll over 
their ten-month commitments into new loans.   Connecting the dots, all of this suggests 
that there is a meaningful risk that a peer-to-peer intermediary will suddenly stop funding 
financial institutions that play significant roles in key regions or sectors of host country 
economies.   At the same time, such intermediaries are susceptible to regulation while 
neither their funders, nor the ultimate recipients, may be accessible to regulators, or 
susceptible to traditional regulatory tools.69  This raises the question whether the 
intermediary itself should be subject to minimum capital or liquidity buffers adequate to 
absorb distress at either side of the transaction chain that either threatens the 
intermediary’s network or has systemic consequences in the home or (more likely) host 
states.  Applied counter-cyclically—when new intermediation is growing fastest—such 
buffers may also help prevent bubbles from forming.70
Such concerns parallel well-worn policy debates about systemic risk and 
institutions that are too big (or too important, or too interconnected) to fail.  While the 
traditional debate has played out among private domestic for-profit institutions, the fact 
that it may reprise among new peer-to-peer intermediaries reflects the current state of 
global financial integration, and particularly the incorporation of individuals in what had 
previously been the domain of large firms.  
69 Recipient MFIs in host countries are generally subject to some form of traditional regulation, but also 
may seek to preempt systemic problems through self-regulation.  See Bubbles and Self-Regulation, supra
note 66.  
70 Compare Avinash Persaud, Macro-prudential Regulation, WORLD BANK GROUP CRISIS RESPONSE Note
6 (July 2009) available at http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/CrisisResponse/Note6.pdf (advocating 
countercyclical regulation and liquidity buffers). 
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IV. Regulatory responses:  Where the existing frameworks fall short 
A. Regulation of charities
The legal privileges U.S. charities enjoy are conditioned upon their compliance 
with a set of special requirements, designed mainly to ensure that charities’ resources are 
dedicated primarily to activities that generate fairly widely distributed social benefits.  
Those requirements serve the interests of donors in preventing their donations from being 
used for non-charitable purposes.  It also serves the interests of the U.S. government in 
ensuring that the indirect subsidy it provides for charitable donations—in the form of the 
tax deduction—is used appropriately.  However, the requirements imposed on charities 
are not particularly suited to the broader regulatory needs of international financial 
intermediaries, which, as we have seen, also encompass protection of the financial 
interests of providers of funding, the interests of recipients of funding, the interests of 
host states, and general interests in mitigating systemic risks.  The substance of charities 
law is inadequate for these purposes in large part because it subjects the financial 
performance of charities to limited scrutiny, significantly less than managers of 
traditional financial institutions.  Meanwhile, the institutional structure of the U.S. 
charities regime is unsatisfactory because it relies primarily on the Internal Revenue 
Service and state attorneys general, institutions that are not well suited to the task of 
regulating international financial intermediation.  In particular, as they are currently 
organized, those institutions do not have the right incentives either to compete or 
cooperate with their foreign counterparts. 
The most salient feature of charities law in these respects is that it exempts 
managers of charities from oversight by residual claimants.  As we have already noted, 
although residual claimants may sometimes encourage excessive risk-taking, they also 
have a unique interest in encouraging an organization to maximize its financial returns.  
The Internal Revenue Code’s “non-distribution constraint” effectively bars charities from 
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issuing residual claims to providers of capital.71  The constraint also serves to limit 
informal distributions of benefits to insiders of a charity, whether or not they are 
characterized as distributions to equity holders.  Charities’ managers are legally 
accountable to regulators, such as state attorneys general, and the Internal Revenue 
Service.72  Agency costs in charities are also controlled by factors such as managers’ 
altruism, pride, and careerism, as well as competition from other intermediaries.  The 
need to attract continued support from donors also serves to control agency costs, 
although donor funding can simultaneously blunt the impact of competition.73  It is 
unclear whether those factors will be sufficient to motivate peer-to-peer intermediaries 
organized as charities to maximize financial returns.  We suspect that regulators, donors, 
and managers are, relative to residual claimants, more likely to be concerned about social 
outcomes. 
U.S. law also imposes distinct disclosure obligations on charities; these 
obligations are not designed primarily to facilitate oversight of their financial 
performance.  On the one hand, securities issued by charities—the non-distribution 
constraint does not preclude a charity from issuing securities in the nature of debt—are 
71 To qualify as a charitable organization it must be the case that “no part of the net earnings of [the 
organization] inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”  26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). 
72 See generally MARION FREMONT SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2004) (describing the 
organization of nonprofits). 
73 The internal governance structure of nonprofits typically provides no formal role for donors.  The 
charities that concern us here are typically organized as nonprofit corporations.   Directors of nonprofit 
corporations are generally governed by the same fiduciary duties as directors of for-profit corporations 
(although some jurisdictions afford special protection to directors or officers who serve without 
compensation). See Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: 
Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 632 (1998) (“Nonprofit directors and 
officers generally operate under the same legal standards under state law in terms of managerial obligations 
and the duties of loyalty and care as their for-profit peers.”).  For examples of state laws regulating internal 
governance, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 5047.5 and N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. L. § 720-a, both of which 
shield uncompensated directors of 501(c)(3) organizations from liability, subject to a number of important 
exceptions, unless they acted intentionally, in bad faith, or in a grossly negligent fashion.  However, in 
many jurisdictions donors have no ability to sue the directors of a nonprofit corporation for breach of 
fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 997, 
1001 (1997) (donor has no standing to sue either at common law or under the Connecticut Uniform 
Management of Institutional Funds Act).  For a critique of this norm, see Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency 
of the Charitable Dollar, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1960).   See also Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit 
Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835 (1980) (discussing the economic role played by nonprofit organizations); Rob 
Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J.
CORP. L. 655  (1998) (discussing the question of who should have standing to sue nonprofit organizations).  
On the other hand, larger donors may bargain for a role in the governance of charities.   
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exempt from some of the requirements imposed by federal and state securities laws.  In 
particular, offerings of securities by charitable nonprofits are exempt from the registration 
requirements imposed by the federal securities laws.74  They are not exempt from the 
anti-fraud provisions of those laws75 (or from other legal prohibitions on fraud), which 
effectively require issuers to disclose all material information to purchasers of securities.  
But instruments that do not offer their holders anything more than a promise to repay 
their investment, such as Kiva’s zero interest commitments to its online lenders, do not 
appear to be considered securities, implying that  they are not subject even to the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws.76  On the other hand, charities and, in some cases, 
those who solicit funds on their behalf, are typically subject to registration and annual 
reporting requirements imposed by both the Internal Revenue Code77 and state laws.78
The disclosure requirements imposed by the Internal Revenue Code and state law are less 
rigorous than those imposed by the securities laws, if only because they require less 
frequent disclosure—the securities laws require issuers of registered securities to disclose 
various sorts of information quarterly, and also require almost immediate disclosure of 
74 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(4) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(4) (2006)); Securities Exchange Act of  
1934 § 12(g)(2)(D) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(2)(D) (2006)); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 
3(c)(10) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(10) (2006)).  
75 SEC v. Bennett, 889 F.Supp. 804, 807 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
76 Kiva decided not to offer interest to its online lenders on the basis of this interpretation of the securities 
laws. See Flannery, supra note 34, at 37.  In deciding whether an investment arrangement is a security 
fully subject to the disclosure and liability regime of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, U.S. courts have interpreted the phrase “investment contract” in the statutes as “a contract, 
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect 
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party…”  SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 
298-99 (1946) (interpreting §2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933).  The expectation of profits element of 
the Howey test has been critical in the case of the new intermediaries.  (The Supreme Court’s leading 
interpretation of this element is in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) 
(analyzing shares in a housing co-operative, where the shareholders’ interest is in living in the housing 
development rather than earning financial returns)). See also Jenna Holtzman, How Should Americans’ 
Investments in International Micro Finance be Regulated in the United States?  (unpublished manuscript 
on file with authors) (reviewing case law on definition of a security). U.S. securities regulators are not the 
only ones who draw a sharp distinction between zero interest loans and those which entail a higher interest 
rate. Babyloan, a French online lending platform, reports that it initially wanted to set an interest of 1 to 2 
percent, but eventually decided to offer lenders zero interest in order to avoid French laws prohibiting any 
entity other than a registered bank from lending at a positive interest rate.  See Babyloan.org, Pourquoi un 
prêt solidaire à 0%?, http://www.babyloan.org/fr/FAQ.html#div1 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
77 See, e.g., IRS, Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (2008).  
78 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC., Art. 7-A, § 172 (2002) (requiring registration of charitable and other nonprofit 
organizations that solicit contributions from New York state).  See generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW
OF FUNDRAISING (4th ed.) (2009).
31
material information concerning changes in the company’s financial condition or 
operations.
Charities law does not impose any special regulatory requirements on charities 
that engage in financial intermediation that might offset adverse effects on financial 
performance of either the non-distribution constraint or charities’ reduced disclosure 
obligations.  For instance, charities generally are subject to significant restrictions on 
their commercial activities, but for a variety of reasons these do not necessarily impose 
meaningful constraints on financial intermediation.  A bedrock principle of the regulatory 
scheme established by the Internal Revenue Code is that charities must be operated 
primarily for charitable purposes, a restriction that one might think would preclude 
inherently commercial activities such as issuing or distributing securities, making 
potentially risky investments, or holding deposits.79  In fact, however, charitable purposes 
have been deemed to include the provision of financial services to poor or disadvantaged 
individuals, or even to businesses located in neighborhoods inhabited mainly by poor or 
disadvantaged people.80  Consequently, peer-to-peer financial intermediaries organized as 
charities have solid grounds for arguing that provision of financial services to inhabitants 
of developing countries qualifies as ordinary charitable activity.  Similarly, charities are 
typically subject to restrictions on their investment activities that are generally designed 
to limit the amount of risk they assume.81  Significantly, however, these restrictions do 
not apply to assets whose primary purpose is to accomplish the organization’s charitable 
purposes—so-called “program-related” assets.82  So, for example, charities’ investments 
in securities or notes issued by organizations whose operations tend to benefit poor or 
disadvantaged people qualify as program-related investments and are not subject to the 
same kind of scrutiny as other investments. 
79  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1) (as amended in 2009). 
80 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162. 
81 Under state law, charities are not only required to exercise care and prudence in the management of their 
assets, but are also subject to more specific directives, such as to incur “only costs that are appropriate and 
reasonable in relation to the assets” or to “consider the charitable purposes of the institution” in managing 
and investing the assets.  See UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT [hereinafter, 
UPMIFA] §§ 3(a), 3(c)(1).  They are also encouraged to diversify their investments. Id. § 3(e)(4).  
82 See id. § 2(7) (“Program-related asset means an asset held by an institution primarily to accomplish a 
charitable purpose of the institution and not primarily for investment”). 
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The institutional features of the U.S. charities regime are also poorly suited to the 
regulation of international financial intermediation.  As we have already discussed, the 
institutions principally responsible for administering the U.S. regime are the Internal 
Revenue Service and state attorneys general.  Those actors are reasonably well-suited to 
administering annual reporting requirements, pursuing allegations of fraud, and 
sanctioning the use of charitable donations for non-charitable purposes.  However, they 
often lack the resources or the institutional capacity to pursue even those mandates.83
Moreover, they do not have the expertise to conduct ongoing monitoring of the risk posed 
by financial intermediaries to other parts of the financial system in home and host 
countries.  They also are not particularly well suited to account for any interests that 
foreign actors might have in the administration and oversight of U.S. financial 
intermediaries.  
More generally, the institutional framework that governs U.S. charities is less than 
ideal because it creates a regulatory oligopoly.  According to the Internal Revenue Code, 
to qualify as a charity an organization must be “created or organized in the United States 
or in any possession thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, the District 
of Columbia, or any possession of the United States”84 and recognized as a charity by the 
IRS.85  Limited exceptions to this rule have been made pursuant to bilateral treaties for 
charities recognized by authorities in Canada, Israel, and Mexico.86  The general rule, 
83See, Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight: An Alternative Approach, Hauser Center Working Paper No. 
33.4, available online at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hauser/PDF_XLS/workingpapers/workingpaper_33.4.pdf
 (discussing the fiscal and structural factors that limit the efficacy of IRS oversight of charitable 
organizations); Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Attorney General Oversight of Charities, Hauser Center 
Working Paper No. 41, available online at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hauser/PDF_XLS/workingpapers/workingpaper_41.pdf  (discussing 
limitations (discussing criticisms of attorney general oversight). 
84 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A). 
85 I.R.C. § 508(a).  See generally Pozen, supra note 47, (describing theories of applying charitable 
deductions to internationally targeted donations); Chang et al., supra note 51, 601-12 (1997) (surveying tax 
deductions established by international tax treaties); Dale, supra note 51 (describing tax treatment of 
foreign charities). 
86 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, U.S.-Can., art. 21, ¶ 5, Sept. 26, 1980, 
T.I.A.S. No. 11,087; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Mex., art. 22, ¶ 1, Sept. 18, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-
7; Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Isr., art. 15, ¶ 1, Nov. 20, 1975, K.A.V. 971.  
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however, effectively gives U.S. lawmakers (collectively) a monopoly on formulating the 
organizational laws of charities, even where the object of charity and the bulk of 
charitable activity are outside the United States.  In other words, charities competing for 
U.S. taxpayers’ donations do not face competition from entities other than those overseen 
by the IRS and governed by U.S. organizational laws. 
The immediate consequence of this state of affairs is that donors do not have the 
opportunity to channel their donations through intermediaries subject to potentially 
superior regulatory frameworks.  The absence of regulatory competition also has dynamic 
effects.  For one thing, at the margins, U.S. charities face less competition for charitable 
donations from U.S. taxpayers than they would in a more competitive system, thus 
reducing their managers’ incentives to improve their performance.  Finally, to the extent 
regulatory competition encourages regulators to make their regimes more appealing to 
donors, the absence of regulatory competition means that U.S. lawmakers lack the 
incentives to alter the U.S. regime in response to developments overseas. 
B. Regulation of financial institutions  
The preoccupations of financial institutions regulation are a mirror image of 
charities regulation.  While charities law focuses primarily on ensuring that 
intermediaries generate adequate social returns, bank and securities regulators tend to 
focus on whether banks and investment funds satisfy the risk-taking and repayment 
expectations of their depositors and investors, especially retail depositors and small 
investors.  Governments also put a high priority on protecting the financial system as a 
whole from the effects of firm failure, and seek to protect recipients of funds from fraud 
and exploitation.  Compared to the regime that governs charities, the regime that governs 
financial institutions has muscular disclosure requirements, a consensus on core 
regulatory parameters such as capital adequacy, an elaborate supervision infrastructure, 
and channels for cross-border communication and coordination among regulators, all of 
which are likely to be fortified in the aftermath of the crisis.  However, with very few 
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exceptions,87 it purports to be essentially blind to the development impact of investment, 
which is of course central to many of those interested in financing development using the 
new peer-to-peer intermediaries.   
The U.S. regime for regulating financial institutions keys off the nature of their 
funders’ expectations, the amount of discretion granted to the intermediary, its 
vulnerability to systemic risk and the extent to which unsophisticated individuals are at 
risk.  The most stringent regulation is imposed on banks, which both commit to pay 
depositors a specific financial rate of return, and enjoy broad discretion over the use of 
depositors’ funds.  The inherent maturity mismatch on their balance sheets and their 
central role in macroeconomic, payments and credit systems puts banks at the center of 
systemic risk concerns.  Depositors have virtually no role in the governance of the bank.  
Bank regulation addresses the resulting concerns about agency costs and collective action 
problems through mechanisms such as minimum capital requirements, chartering rules, 
activities restrictions, supervision, and insurance.88
87 See Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (2006).  The Act was designed to counteract 
discriminatory lending practices, also known as “red-lining,” in order to increase the level of development 
in lower-income neighborhoods.  See id. § 2901 (“It is the purpose of this title to require each appropriate 
Federal financial supervisory agency… to encourage [financial] institutions to help meet the credit needs of 
the local communities in which they are chartered”). 
88 First, to secure a federal bank charter in the United States, the organizers must demonstrate the 
“experience, competence, willingness, and ability” to run a safe and sound institution; have the capacity to 
supply or obtain capital when the bank needs it, and have a business plan that passes regulatory muster.  
See generally 12 C.F.R. § 5.20; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S
LICENSING MANUAL: CHARTERS (2009). State chartering requirements are broadly similar.  Further specific 
restrictions on bank affiliation advance a range of policy goals, from protecting deposits to guarding against 
conflicts and political power concentration.  Thus the United States insisted on the separation of 
commercial and investment banking for much of the 20th century, and still bars commercial firms from 
acquiring banks.  See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(c)(1), 1843(a), (c), (k); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the 
Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539 (2007).  Second, somewhat like charities, 
banks are permitted a limited range of activities and investments.  Bank powers are restricted to those 
specifically enumerated by law (for example, taking deposits, making loans, leasing, foreign exchange), 
and those incidental to “the business of banking.”  12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006).  Banks are also affirmatively 
required to engage in some activities by, for example, the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 
2901-08.  In some cases, the “business of banking” has been interpreted broadly by the regulators.  Saule 
Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the ‘Business of Banking’, 63 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1041 (2009). Some activities are expressly prohibited, such as owning real estate and underwriting 
corporate securities.  12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 29.  In addition, bank transactions with affiliates are restricted to 
guard against conflicts and self-dealing.  §§ 371c, 371c-1.  Third, banks must maintain internationally 
agreed minimum levels of capital, calculated as a ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets, as well as a 
minimum leverage ratio of capital to assets.  §§ 1831o(c)(1), 3907.  Note that securities broker-dealers are 
also subject to minimum capital requirements.  Fourth, the supervision process is a critical feature of bank 
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Unlike banks, investment companies do not, and cannot by law, guarantee their 
investors a specific rate of return.  Investment companies enjoy limited discretion over 
the deployment of investors’ funds, consistent with stated investment objectives, and are 
subject to a less intrusive regulatory regime.  Nearly all investment companies in the 
United States are organized as “management companies” under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940,89 which effectively mandates their corporate form.90  Investment companies 
are required to register with the SEC, and to furnish the SEC with extensive disclosure of 
their investment policies and financial condition, both upon initial registration,91 and 
thereafter as part of annual and semiannual reporting.92  Most relevant for our purposes, 
the initial registration statement must disclose whether the intermediary’s investment 
strategy includes concentration in a particular industry or economic sector, and must 
identify any policies that are so “fundamental” that changing them would require 
shareholder approval.93  Fund names are regulated so as to avoid misleading investors 
about the mission and investment strategy of their intermediary.94  The Investment 
Company Act prohibits intermediaries from entering into transactions with a broadly 
defined range of affiliated persons.  In addition, the Investment Advisers Act95 contains a 
range of substantive requirements designed to guard against fraud and conflicts of 
oversight.  Each bank must file quarterly reports of its financial condition, providing extensive balance 
sheet data to their regulators.  Banks also must file periodic income reports and submit to on-site 
examinations.  § 1820(d).  Fifth, the government insures depositors against bank failure up to a relatively 
generous amount that captures most retail and some small business deposits.  § 1821(a).  In the United 
States, the insurance limit was recently raised to $250,000.  The insurance fund, administered by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, is financed with industry premiums, but also backed by the full 
faith and credit of the United States in the event the premiums run short.  Insurance is actually central to 
bank regulation: one may conceive of the regime as protecting the taxpayer, rather than the insured 
depositor.  
89 The Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(3) (2006). 
90 The Investment Company Act requires that at least 40 percent of the company’s board be independent, 
and subjects key decisions to the approval of independent directors.   §§ 80a-10(b)(1), 80a-15(c).  A key 
function of the board under the law is to oversee the investment adviser (typically, the firm that established 
the investment company), who manages the company’s portfolio. 
91 § 80a-8(a)-(b). 
92 § 80a-29(a), (e)-(g). 
93 § 80a-8(b)(2). 
94 A hypothetical “Long-Term Income Fund” may not pursue a short-term growth investment strategy. 
95 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to b-20. 
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interest.  Recent enforcement actions have emphasized the advisers’ position of trust with 
respect to investors.96
Unlike banks and investment funds, brokers, dealers and investment advisers do 
not intermediate between funders and their targets; rather, they facilitate direct 
investment.  The regulatory regime consequently focuses on optimizing the flow of 
information to the investors through disclosure and fiduciary duties for agents and 
advisers.97  Such securities firms are regulated in the United States by the SEC, under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as well as by 
self-regulatory organizations such as major stock exchanges and the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA).98 And although they are subject to capital requirements 
and a measure of supervision, by far the bulk of regulatory emphasis in securities 
issuance and trading is on disclosure. 
Regulatory reform in the wake of the latest financial crisis has sought to elevate 
the profile of consumer financial protection.  Initiatives respond to criticism of U.S. 
regulators for neglecting consumers in the run up to the crisis, leading to dismal social 
and systemic consequences.99  Congress moved to consolidate consumer protection 
functions dispersed among financial regulatory agencies.  At this writing, bills passed by 
the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate each provide for a new consumer 
financial protection body with primary jurisdiction over consumer financial products and 
services, Both versions of the legislation vest the new body with broad rulemaking and 
96 State prosecutors have accused investment advisers of breaching their duty of loyalty through “late-
trading” and “market-timing” practices favoring some investors over others. 
97 See Huang, Clancy, Dominitz, Talley, Berrebi & Suvankulov, Investor and Industry Perspectives on 
Investment Advisers and Broker Dealers, Rand Institute for Civil Justice (2008) 7-21, 127-128, at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf (analyzing the practical limitations of 
imposing different client duties on broker-dealers and investment advisors).  
98 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o-3.  
99 For a discussion of the trend to declining protection in the run up to the crisis, see Patricia A. McCoy & 
Elizabeth Renuart, The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and Nontraditional Home Mortgages, in
BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 110 (Nicolas Paul Retsinas & Eric S. 
Belsky eds., 2008).  
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enforcement powers under existing and new consumer financial protection laws to 
prevent and sanction “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.”100
The House of Representatives bill grants the consumer protection agency primary 
authority to regulate “person-to-person lending” and “person-to-person lending 
platforms” and exempts the sale of loans or notes in connection with person-to-person 
lending transactions from the securities laws.101  The definition of person-to-person 
lending is limited to transactions that involve individual borrowing for family, personal, 
educational, household or business purposes.102  These provisions do not affect 
intermediaries that sell either interests in loans extended to organizations as opposed to 
individuals or interests in bundled consumer loans.  The new legislation also does not 
distinguish between charitable and non-charitable person-to-person lending platforms.  
As a result it is unclear whether intermediaries that are exempt from the S.E.C.’s 
prospectus filing requirements because they are charities would remain exempt on the 
same grounds, or would be regulated more actively by the new consumer protection 
body.
The regime that governs U.S. financial institutions has a track record of taking 
concerns about cross-border effects into account.  International regulatory cooperation 
was reasonably robust in financial services even before the crisis, and has received a 
boost from the recognition of the global reach of the crisis.  The Basel Capital Accords 
have promulgated a voluntary minimum standard for capital adequacy since the late 
1980s; the Basel I standard was universally adopted by national regulators, effectively 
becoming a core norm of bank regulation worldwide.  The Basel Committee on Bank 
100 See, H.R. 4173, Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, Subtitles B, C at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/Key_Issues/Financial_Regulatory_Reform/Financial_Regulatory_Refor
m020210.html; S. 3217, Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, Subtitles B, C at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:s3217as.txt.pdf.
Such legislation follows proposals for a stand-alone federal consumer financial protection body in Oren 
Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 PENN L. REV. 1 (2008). 
101 H.R. 4173, §4315, Regulation of Person-to-Person Lending.  Securities laws disclosure requirements are 
to apply until new ones are formulated. 
102 Elsewhere in the bill the term “Consumer Financial Product or Service” is defined to mean financial 
activities used by consumers “primarily for personal, family or household purposes.” See, H.R. 4173,  
§4002(8);; S. 3217, §1002(5). 
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Supervision103 promulgates common principles for bank supervision, which are also 
widely followed.  Securities regulators coordinate through the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO);104 however, they have not achieved their bank 
counterparts’ level of substantive regulatory harmonization.  In the wake of the financial 
crises of the late 1990s, governments in leading financial centers established the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to coordinate their regulatory and standard-setting 
efforts.  The FSF was, from the start, an informal and hybrid body, comprising both 
government regulators and private standard-setters, with no enforcement powers.  
Following the financial crisis of 2008 and the emergence of the Group of Twenty wealthy 
and developing states as the leading forum for coordinating economic and financial 
policies, the FSF was expanded, renamed as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and 
given broad responsibilities for regulatory coordination and peer review.  However, it still 
has no formal institutional charter or direct enforcement authority.105
This history of coordination reflects in part the intractable challenge of allocating 
responsibility for transnational financial activities among national regulators.  For 
instance, internationally active institutions must be supervised on a consolidated 
basis106—which in effect puts the bulk of regulatory and supervisory responsibility on 
home country authorities—although home and host regulators are expected to share 
information and cooperate.107  The original impetus behind worldwide consolidated 
supervision came from the implosion of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(BCCI) in the late 1980s, which defrauded customers and depositors in host countries 
throughout Europe, Asia, and North America.  By the late 1990s, the regulatory paradigm 
shifted to embrace the expansion of European and North American financial institutions 
throughout the developing world.  Home and host roles switched.  Giving home 
regulators more authority was deemed sensible because the major financial centers were 
thought to be closer to best regulatory practices.  In effect, poor and middle-income states 
103 Bank for International Settlements, About the Basel Committee, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2010) 
104 International Organization of Securities Commissions, http://www.iosco.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).   
105 Financial Stability Board, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).   




were importing good regulation.  However, the crises of the 1990s and even more so the 
crises of this decade revealed problems with this regime:  home regulators rarely, if ever, 
targeted the economic and financial conditions in host states.  Thus consolidated home 
regulation and supervision has in some cases led to foreign institutions fueling asset 
bubbles, and exacerbating contractions in the host states.108  For example, Swedish and 
Austrian banks were at the forefront of the recent lending boom in Eastern Europe, yet 
Swedish and Austrian regulators had no mandate to target the macroeconomic stability of 
Latvia or Hungary, nor the capacity to regulate their own banking systems for the sake of 
capital recipients.  Bubbles, crises, and painful contractions followed in the host 
countries.  In response, the pendulum appears to be swinging in the direction of more 
host regulation.109  Post-crisis regulation is also likely to seek smaller and safer finance—
an approach that may make sense for the multitrillion dollar derivatives industry, but one 
that could cut off badly needed and already scarce funds for development. 
 Regulatory competition is another perennial feature of the financial regulatory 
discourse, more so than in charities regulation.  Competition is in part a function of the 
inherent mobility of capital; however, governments have historically sought to restrict 
their citizens’ capacity to invest abroad and foreigners’ entry into their financial 
markets.110  Academics have long criticized U.S. barriers to cross-border investing.111
More recently, as more countries removed restrictions on capital flows, competitive 
108 See, e.g., Guillermo Ortiz, Governor of the Bank of Mex., Keynote Address at the 14th International 
Conference of Banking Supervisors: The Participation of International Banks in Emerging Economies (Oct. 
5, 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r061016b.pdf.  
109 See, e.g., THE WARWICK COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORM, IN PRAISE OF UNLEVEL 
PLAYING FIELDS, 41-49 (2009), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/ 
(discussing the appropriate venue for regulation). 
110 Such efforts have often backfired, famously in the case of the U.S. Interest Equalization Tax on U.S. 
residents’ income from foreign securities, in effect between 1963 and 1974.  It was meant to dissuade U.S. 
investors from sending money abroad, but is now credited with spurring the vast offshore Eurodollar 
market based in London.  
111 For proposals to allow issuers to choose a regulatory regime applicable to their transactions, see Roberta 
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); 
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of 
Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998).  For an argument against barriers in mutual fund 
investing, see John C. Coates IV, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comparative 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 1 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 591 (2009).  See also Jerry Ellig & Houman B. Shadab, 
Talking the Talk, or Walking the Walk?  Outcome-Based Regulation of Transnational Investment, 41
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 265 (2009). 
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concerns have moved to the U.S. policy forefront.112  In the peer-to-peer context, 
restrictions on direct cross-border investing arguably distort the market in favor of home-
country intermediaries, especially where foreign intermediaries and MFIs are not 
organized with an eye to regulatory exemptions under U.S. law.  At the extreme, U.S.-
based intermediaries may be creatures of residual capital controls.  This concern is in 
addition to the broader point that home regulation does not account for host country 
policy needs. 
Explicit social policy, even purely domestic, has been a relatively small and 
heavily criticized element of for-profit financial services.  Governments have subtle ways 
of encouraging lending for favored policy goals, but explicit requirements have been rare 
in the United States, with the prominent exception of state-sponsored housing finance 
vehicles.  The ongoing controversy over community reinvestment is a case in point.113
Critics have argued that requiring banks to lend in poor neighborhoods—in effect, 
domestic financing for development—conflicts with safety and soundness objectives of 
bank regulation, and have recently blamed the financial crisis on a mix of community 
reinvestment and housing policy lending.114  Redistribution and social responsibility have 
yet to be assimilated in mainstream finance; they sit uneasily on its margins. 
Failure to account for host country policy concerns and a strained relationship 
with social policy are among the several ways in which existing financial regulation is a 
poor fit for the international peer-to-peer intermediaries.  The current regime also has a 
discontinuous structure that is prone both to over- and under-regulating hybrids.  At the 
extreme, if a “peer funder” collects just 1 percent interest, it may be entitled to the full 
112 See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf (responding to 
competitive concerns); The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, http://www.capmktsreg.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2010) (reports by a group of eminent academics and business leaders addressing New 
York’s competitiveness as a financial center and attributing it to regulatory factors).  But see Eric J. Pan, 
Why the World No Longer Puts Its Stock in Us (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Jacob Burns Institute 
for Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 176, 2006) (advancing alternative explanations for the rise 
of finance outside the United States). 
113 See e.g., Michael Barr, Credit Where It Counts:  The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics 80 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 513 (2005)
114 See e.g., Peter J. Wallison, The True Origins of This Financial Crisis The American Spectator, Feb. 
2009, available at http://spectator.org/archives/2009/02/06/the-true-origins-of-this-finan.
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range of costly disclosure, registration, and anti-fraud protections of the U.S. securities 
laws; in contrast, collecting no interest would make the transaction exempt.  This is so 
even if, in both cases, the ultimate “peer borrower” pays interest to its intermediary at 20 
percent, and each funder gets a legal and binding promise to repay the principal and a 
glossy brochure touting a history of over 95 percent repayment rates.    
The existing elaborate and costly financial regulatory regime justifies itself 
primarily in terms of protecting small investors and depositors.  Such a regime should, in 
theory, be concerned with potential for fraud and manipulation involving $25 loans to 
pooling vehicles for the benefit of high-risk borrowers with no foreign exchange earning 
capacity in high-risk countries.  This should not change just because the $25 is interest-
free, the investor is partly motivated by charity, and the pooling vehicle is not organized 
as either a bank or an investment fund.  The $25 could be lent in irrational exuberance 
through an undercapitalized intermediary, based on false disclosure that the principal is 
“safe”.
This is a case for functional regulation, rather than a regime that keys off 
institutional formalities.115  To be sure, if the funders really meant to give their money 
away—a 100 percent grant in the form of a loan—regulation geared to default risk and 
risk monitoring is beside the point.   But if the funders do, or will as the sector matures, 
take the repayment promise seriously, they should have access to a modicum of 
information to help them decide whether the repayment expectation is in fact justified.  
Put differently, the grant element in a peer-to-peer loan can vary drastically depending on 
the riskiness of the ultimate loan, the character and credit of the intermediaries, and the 
resulting discount.  The only way to know that the funder had consented to make a grant 
in the effective amount is to provide her with adequate disclosure. 
115 See GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN 
A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 8-12 (2008), available at 
http://www.group30.org/pubs/GRP30_FRS_ExecSumm.pdf (describing institutional, functional, unitary, 
and twin peaks models of financial regulation and supervision).
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On the other hand, there is risk of over-regulation:  charities are exempt from 
disclosure and registration aspects of securities laws in part because the cost of 
compliance is out of proportion with nonprofit finances.  Bank oversight is so strict in 
part out of concern about bank runs arising out of structural maturity mismatches (absent 
in peer-to-peer finance to date) and misbehavior by equity holders in a highly leveraged 
firm (a model that does not apply to nonprofits that have no residual claimants).  The 
challenge, then, is to scale financial regulation to the functions of the new intermediaries, 
without compromising their development policy objectives. 
Shifting regulatory authority over peer-to-peer lending from the SEC to a 
specialized consumer protection body has the potential—depending on how that body 
exercises its authority— to address some of the problems in the current regime, such as 
expensive disclosure requirements that could be especially burdensome for small 
transactions.  However, such initiatives risk creating new regulatory discontinuities.  For 
example, the provisions in the House bill only grant the Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency authority over transactions involving isolated loans made to individuals, 
suggesting that peer-to-peer transactions involving bundled loans or loans to 
organizations would be regulated differently.
C. Private ordering 
 The legal regimes that govern both charities and financial institutions are often 
supplemented by norms formulated by private actors.  Sometimes the relevant actors are 
individuals.  For instance, the background legal constraints on charities’ use of funds are 
often supplemented by more specific constraints imposed by donors who insist that their 
donations be held in trust for specific charitable purposes.  In other situations, industry-
wide organizations play an important role in supplementing the legal regime.116
 Private ordering plays a particularly significant role in the governance of 
microfinance institutions.  The explosive growth of the microfinance industry in recent 
116 Id.
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decades posed a legal and regulatory dilemma.  MFIs sprung up—and had the greatest 
impact—in jurisdictions whose financial regulatory infrastructure was widely understood 
to fall short of the state of the art, in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.  In 
fact, microfinance was partly a response to the shortcomings of the local financial 
systems, which in turn were closely related to regulatory shortcomings.  Host states had 
widely divergent regimes for chartering and regulating the new institutions, and often 
inadvertently erected insurmountable barriers to their operation through chartering rules, 
licensing, and interest rate ceilings, among others.117  In response, the budding 
microfinance community—including nonprofit and for-profit actors, bilateral 
development agencies, and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank—
established clearing houses, consultation procedures, and processes for distilling and 
publishing research and best practices.  The most prominent clearing house of this sort is 
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), an organization housed at the World 
Bank and sponsored by the World Bank and a number of other international financial 
institutions, bilateral aid agencies, and private foundations.  Taken as a whole, the best 
practices developed by CGAP and other bodies represent a remarkably sophisticated 
example of private regulation. 
Private regulation is now being extended to some of the intermediaries that 
channel funds to MFIs.  In response to the rapid growth of for-profit private investment in 
microfinance, especially in the wholesale capital markets, CGAP recently ventured 
beyond MFI regulation into guidelines for Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs).118
The initial round of guidelines was produced in 2007, prompted by a request from the 
International Finance Corporation (the private sector arm of the World Bank), in 
consultation with a diverse group of industry experts and market participants.  Although 
most of the disclosure variables address financial reporting, the draft product explicitly 
contemplates the development of social performance indicators.  The model is promising 
because it aspires to create a template for consistent and comparable reporting across a 
117 See MICROFINANCE CONSENSUS GUIDELINES, supra note 66, at 6-12 (describing regulations imposed by 
host states). 
118 CGAP, MICROFINANCE INVESTMENT VEHICLES (MIV) DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR REPORTING ON 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (2007), available at http://cgap.org/gm/document-
1.9.3111/MIVGuidelines2007-draft.pdf.  
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range of regulatory systems, and reflects the existing reporting standards under securities 
and accounting rules in key jurisdictions.  Perhaps more importantly, it builds on the 
existing private ordering infrastructure for MFIs, and promises to create a transnational 
regime that is focused on the information needs of cross-border investors in 
microfinance.  On the other hand, the fact that the CGAP and its collaborators currently 
dominate the market for this sort of private regulation may raise concerns in some 
quarters about whether private regulation is likely to produce optimal results.  
Competition among private regulators has the same potential advantages (and 
disadvantages) as regulatory competition among public actors.119
 The MIV Guidelines appear as an example of very promising private regulation.  
It is difficult, however, to generalize about the advantages and disadvantages of private 
ordering.  Much depends on the particularities of the ordering in question, including 
whether all affected parties are represented and the level of competition across regimes.  
V. Policy Implications 
So how should the new peer-to-peer intermediaries be regulated?  For starters, we 
do not believe that they ought to be regulated exclusively as either charities or financial 
intermediaries; nor should they be regulated solely by the jurisdiction in which providers 
of funds are located.  As we have argued above, the regime that governs charities is not 
well-suited to regulating organizations that take on meaningful financial commitments to 
members of the general public.  At the same time, the regime that governs traditional 
financial intermediaries is not well-suited to protecting the private and public interests in 
achieving social as well as financial outcomes.  It focuses entirely on repayment, and is 
also essentially blind to the central policy objective of foreign assistance: improving 
development outcomes, which requires a significant increase in funding as well as 
accountability.  The U.S. regime in particular still largely keys off legal formalities (for 
example, chartering), rather than the economic substance of financial activities, which 
119 David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.  371, 437-442 (2003). 
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makes it poorly suited to regulate actors active in multiple fields.  More generally, 
regulatory institutions in the jurisdiction of the provider of funds are ill-suited to 
protecting either the interests of recipients of funds or the broader interests of inhabitants 
of host countries, nor can they single-handedly ensure the smooth operation of the 
financial systems that transcend national borders.
In response to these concerns we offer the following recommendations for reform of 
the regulatory framework that governs international peer-to-peer financial intermediaries: 
1. Presumptively apply financial regulation—including any new consumer 
protection regulation—to all actors that promise to return some portion of the 
provider’s funds, regardless of charitable status or level of returns.
2. Reform charities laws to permit international regulatory competition. 
3. Enhance monitoring of financial flows through international peer-to-peer 
intermediaries on concessional terms. 
4. Promote regulation by host states. 
5. Promote private ordering as a supplement to legal regulation. 
1.  Subject all actors that promise financial returns, regardless of charitable status or 
level of returns, to regulation as financial institutions 
Intermediaries that make financial commitments to providers of funds raise distinct 
regulatory concerns from those that do not.  As illustrated by current U.S. law, the nature 
of the regulatory regime can and should vary depending on the expectations the 
intermediary creates and the amount of discretion it enjoys.  We do not prescribe a 
specific mode of regulation or fix regulatory authority in a single institution, since we 
believe that these decisions ought to be made on functional grounds, based on the nature 
of the services being offered by the intermediary in question.120  In some cases, disclosure 
120 Cf. Holtzman, supra note 73 (recommending creation of a less rigorous version of existing securities 
regulation for electronic intermediaries that solicit investments in microfinance in the United States). 
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on the securities law model may be appropriate; in others, supervision and even insurance 
on the banking law model may be suitable.121  We also believe that the appropriate 
regulatory regime will need to adapt over time as the peer-to-peer financing industry 
continues to change and evolve.  However, we accept the fundamental idea that 
regulation is required to protect the interests of people who run the risk of not receiving 
the financial returns they have been promised by an intermediary.  These concerns are 
particularly salient when the intermediary offers relatively a variegated set of products to 
the general public and consequently has a fragmented and complex capital structure. 
We believe that these risks are present regardless of whether the intermediary 
qualifies as a charity and regardless of whether it offers to return more or less than 100 
percent of the funds advanced to it.  In these respects our position is inconsistent with the 
regulatory status quo.122  Under current law, if a charity solicits funds from 
unsophisticated members of the general public in exchange for a promise to invest in a 
charitable venture and repay the money in due course, the transaction is not likely to be 
subject to either securities laws or the laws applicable to banks or investment companies, 
so long as there is no promise to pay interest.  In effect, the promise to repay principal 
falls through the cracks of the regulatory regime—more easily so when bundled with the 
promise to do good.  But as we have discussed, the fact that an entity is subject to the 
disclosure obligations and organizational requirements of charities law does not substitute 
for regulation geared to credit risk assessment, of the kind (if not necessarily to the full 
extent) imposed on banks or registered investment companies.  An intermediary that 
offers providers of funds a zero percent interest rate (or less) can still expose to them to 
the risk of substantial or total losses.  For example, many of the new international peer-
to-peer intermediaries channel their funding through local microfinance institutions and 
expose their online lenders to the credit risk of those entities.  That credit risk can be 
substantial, because investors are likely to recover very little when microfinance 
121 We leave to another day the question of whether any elements of the regulatory scheme that governs 
transactions in derivatives ought to be applied to peer-to-peer intermediaries. 
122 Cf. In re Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8984, 2008 SEC LEXIS 2791 (Nov. 24, 
2008) (emphasizing both the risk of loss and the profit motive in determining whether an online lending 
platform offered securities to the public in violation of the Securities Act of 1933). 
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institutions become insolvent.123  There is no reason to presume that providers of funds 
are willing to accept such a risk of loss simply because charitable motivations led them to 
accept a below-market rate of return.  We believe that filling this regulatory gap is 
essential to safeguard the integrity and foster sustainable growth of peer-to-peer financing 
for development. 
We also recognize that under current law many of the services currently offered by 
peer-to-peer international intermediaries would be substantially exempt from regulation 
because of the small size of the transactions and parties involved.124  Such exemptions 
will be appropriate in many cases, but we are reluctant to presume that peer-to-peer 
financial intermediaries deserve a blanket exemption from regulation simply because they 
are small, or their transactions involve small amounts of money.  The danger is that such 
an exemption would give a free pass to intermediaries who serve the least wary providers 
of funds and the most vulnerable beneficiaries—in other words, the intermediaries most 
in need of regulation.
A recent securities enforcement action illustrates both our substantive concerns and 
the limits of the existing regulatory regime when facing hybrid products and institutions.  
In 2008, the SEC sued Prosper Marketplace, a peer-to-peer platform where small lenders 
funded bank loans of $1,000 to $25,000 for anonymous borrowers.125  Although the 
Commission acknowledged the possibility of charitable motives among Prosper 
investors, it deemed these motives unimportant.  The Commission also made no mention 
of the idea that the relatively small amounts at stake might weigh against regulatory 
intervention.  At the same time the Prosper case reaffirmed the limits of the current 
regime.  Following existing law, the Commission made it clear that its decision to assert 
jurisdiction over Prosper turned in part on the fact that, in addition to any good feelings, 
123 See, e.g., ROZAS, supra note 37, at 3. 
124 Cf. ADVISORY COMM. ON SMALLER PUB. COMPANIES, FINAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (2006) 20-21 (discussing the history of “scaling” securities 
regulation to reflect the size of the issuers and transactions, and to achieve regulatory efficiencies).  Such 
regulatory economy may be particularly important in host states where regulatory personnel and expertise 
may be scarce.  
125 Prosper Marketplace, Securities Act Release No. 8984.  The SEC sanctioned Prosper for selling 
securities to the public without a registration statement on file.  Id.
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“lenders expect a profit . . . at a rate generally higher than that available from depository 
accounts at financial institutions.”126  In contrast, we suggest that any rate higher than 
zero (full grant), representing any expectation of repayment, should be presumptively 
sufficient to prompt oversight.127
Regulating peer-to-peer lending under the consumer protection umbrella rather than 
the securities laws, as proposed in the House bill, has the potential to limit the effect of 
the Prosper litigation.128   However, to be effective, any new regulatory scheme must go 
beyond the securities disclosure model to reflect prudential concerns as appropriate, 
cover intermediaries that are charitable entities, govern a broad range of transactions 
(including loans to organizations rather individuals and pooled loans), and have the 
capacity to coordinate internationally to reflect recipient and host state concerns. 
2. Reform charities laws to permit international regulatory competition 
The preferential tax treatment afforded to charities creates strong incentives to 
establish these intermediaries as charities.  Consequently, one way to enhance regulation 
of these entities is to enhance the regime that governs charities.  A comprehensive review 
of possible reforms to charities law is beyond the scope of this article.  However, one 
potential reform merits particular attention: U.S. lawmakers could grant U.S. taxpayers 
deductions for donations to charitable organizations that are overseen by foreign 
regulators and organized under foreign laws and whose activities are intended to benefit 
126 Id. at 3; see also id. at 5 (“While some Prosper lenders may be motivated, in part, by altruism, altruistic 
and profit motives are not mutually exclusive.”). An earlier case cited in the Prosper order teaches a similar 
lesson: customers who lent money to a wayward broker testified that they were “not primarily motivated by 
desire for profit, but instead by a desire to help a friend in need,” though some saw helping a friend also as 
an opportunity to diversify their investments and limit losses from other investment strategies.  But the high 
interest rates on the loans made it easy to impute the profit motive, which in turn subjected otherwise 
unregulated consumer financial products to elements of securities regulation.  In re McNabb, 54 S.E.C. 
917, 921-23 (2000), aff’d, 298 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2002). 
127 We recognize that this recommendation implies a significant departure from the way in which courts 
have traditionally viewed mixed-motive investment.  See, e.g., United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 
421 U.S. 837, 853-57 (1975) (shares in a housing development are not securities because their primary 
purpose is to give the owner a place to live, not a financial return). 
128 Supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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inhabitants of designated poor or middle-income countries.129  These privileges could be 
extended either to specific countries’ regimes on a case-by-case basis, as the U.S. has 
already done through its bilateral treaties with Canada, Israel, and Mexico, or in a blanket 
fashion to all regimes that meet prescribed standards.130  The list of countries in which the 
eligible organizations would operate could be formulated in consultation with the U.S. 
State Department so as to ensure that U.S. foreign policy interests are taken into 
account.131
Abandoning the “water’s edge” approach to the tax treatment of charitable donations 
would have a number of potential benefits.132  To begin with, it would expand the range 
of choices open to donors who care about U.S. tax deductions.  Those donors might 
appreciate being able to direct their donations to charities that are subject to more 
effective oversight than is offered by U.S. regulators.  For example, if the UK’s Charity 
Commission offers more vigorous oversight of charities than any U.S. state’s attorney 
general, then U.S. donors would benefit from being able to donate to a UK charity.  
Donors might also benefit from receiving tax benefits for supporting charities that are 
subject to different substantive norms.  For example, donors may prefer to donate to 
charities whose regulators require more detailed disclosure about the social impact of 
their work.
Abrogating the water’s edge rule would also expose U.S. charities to greater 
competition—from charities governed by foreign law—for U.S. taxpayers’ donations, 
129 Cf. Dale, supra note 51, at 659-61, 696 (recommending abandonment of ban on deduction of donations 
to foreign charities); Pozen, supra note 47, at 594-601 (same).  Recall that current law already permits 
deductions for donations to charities organized under U.S. law whose activities benefit inhabitants of 
foreign countries.    
130 In 2008 the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission announced that it would adopt a structured case-by-
case approach to mutual recognition arrangements with foreign securities regulators.  See, e.g., Press 
Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Chairman Cox, Prime Minister Rudd Meet Amid U.S-Australia 
Mutual Recognition Talks (Press Release No. 2008-52) (Mar. 29, 2008); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Australian Authorities Sign Mutual Recognition Agreement (Press Release No. 2008-182) (Aug. 
25, 2008).
131 Cf. Pozen, supra note 47, at 595-96 (discussing potential of rescinding geographic restrictions on 
deductions with respect to countries whose regulators are “trust[ed]” by the U.S. government).  
132 The benefits of regulatory competition in the organizational law of charities should parallel the benefits 
of regulatory competition in corporate and securities law.  See Romano, supra note 104; Choi & Guzman, 
supra note 104; Coates, supra note 104; Ellig & Shadab, supra note 104. 
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thereby encouraging both groups of charities to make their offerings more appealing to 
potential U.S. donors.  So for example, Kiva and the Calvert Foundation would face 
competition for U.S. taxpayers’ donations from similar entities incorporated in Europe 
and Asia.133
Finally, abandoning the water’s edge rule might also encourage lawmakers to 
compete.   For instance, if lawmakers measure their success by the popularity of their 
jurisdiction among charities then they will have an incentive to pass laws that are 
relatively appealing to charities and, to the extent they influence charities’ decisions on 
how to regulate themselves, donors.   So, for example, the prospect of ‘losing’ charities to 
the U.K. might prompt U.S. lawmakers to enhance the perceived quality of the U.S. 
charities regime.  We acknowledge, however, that there are reasons to doubt that 
lawmakers will compete in this fashion.134
3. Enhance public monitoring of financial flows through international peer-to-peer 
intermediaries on concessional terms 
Neither charities law nor securities law is designed to give effect to the foreign policy 
concerns of the home states of the providers of funds—a stark contrast to the regime that 
governs Official Development Assistance.  Under the status quo, peer-to-peer 
intermediaries are subject to generally applicable legislation designed to control money 
laundering and terrorist financing, thus addressing home states’ concerns about barring 
private funds from flowing to enemies of the state.  By contrast, the status quo regime 
does relatively little to help home states monitor and control the flow of funds to their 
friends.  In particular, there is no reliable mechanism to allow states to monitor private 
133  We have not been able to find data on the magnitude of donations to non-U.S. organizations operating 
in developing countries.  However, we presume that such competition is minimal under the current regime 
because of the substantial tax advantages of donating to U.S. organizations and evidence suggesting that 
U.S. donors are quite sensitive to tax incentives.  See Pozen, supra note 47, at 568; David Roodman & 
Scott Standley, Tax Policies to Promote Private Charitable Giving in DAC Countries, 9, 11, 18-20 (Ctr. for 
Global Dev., Working Paper No. 82, 2006) (citing evidence that IRS deduction data captures the bulk of 
U.S. private giving and discussing the sensitivity of giving to tax incentives). 
134 See, Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 679 (2002) (arguing that U.S. states do not compete to attract corporations). 
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flows of funds to developing countries and change the allocation of state-controlled flows 
in response.135  This in turn exacerbates the problems of aid coordination and 
accountability.136  To this end, we recommend requiring intermediaries engaged in 
international financing to report the magnitude of flows to various countries and, roughly, 
the extent to which their terms deviate from those of purely commercial transactions in 
the relevant market.  
4. Promote regulation by host states 
The financial crisis has led many to lose faith in the ability of states such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom to serve as the sole regulators of financial 
institutions operating on a global scale.  At the same time increasingly forceful concerns 
have been raised about how effectively these and other wealthy countries have allocated 
foreign aid to developing countries in the post-war era.  Similar skepticism about the 
willingness or ability of wealthy countries to protect the interests of developing countries 
undermines the notion that international peer-to-peer intermediaries should be regulated 
exclusively by their home states, and points to a bigger role for host regulation. 
In the particular case of peer-to-peer intermediaries, concerns about consumer 
protection, developing the capacity of local financial intermediaries, and mitigating 
systemic risk, support host state regulation.  So for example, regulators of microfinance 
institutions in developing countries that receive funds from peer-to-peer intermediaries 
ought to be concerned about factors such as: whether online intermediaries sufficiently 
protect the privacy of local borrowers; whether those intermediaries are exposing 
themselves to excessive currency risk; and whether they are displacing local 
intermediaries.137  For these and other reasons, we recommend that host states reserve the 
135 How ODA should be adjusted to reflect peer-to-peer financing is beyond the scope of this Article.  We 
believe it ought to depend on the answers to empirical questions such as whether the respective flows serve 
as substitutes or complements.  See Kevin E. Davis & Sarah Dadush, The Privatization of Development 
Assistance: Overview of a Symposium [in this volume]. 
136 Cf. Severino & Ray, supra note 17, at 23-24 (recommending radical changes in aid reporting to reflect 
private flows, among others); Raj M. Desai & Homi Kharas, Democratizing Foreign Aid, 42 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. ___ [p. 6 of draft] (2010). 
137 Cf. Burand, supra note 53, at 3-4 (pointing to some of these factors). 
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authority to regulate the activities of foreign peer-to-peer intermediaries operating within 
their boundaries.138
5. Promote private ordering as a supplement to legal regulation 
Designing a legal regime that accommodates the varied interests of providers of 
funds, recipients of funds, home states and host states is a challenging task.  It is 
particularly challenging to craft a single legal regime that accommodates the significant 
amount of heterogeneity that appears to characterize providers of funds.  Different 
providers place different amounts of weight on financial and social returns, and when it 
comes to social returns, their priorities can be infinitely varied.  Some people care about 
improving the lot of women, others about the rural poor, still others focus on particular 
countries or regions.  It is difficult to imagine how any single set of disclosure 
requirements could suit the needs of funders with such diverse motivations. 
Under the circumstances we believe that gaps in legal regulation of peer-to-peer 
intermediaries are inevitable and that private ordering has a significant role to play in 
filling those gaps.  A good example of the kind of private ordering we have in mind is the 
set of advisories and best practices for microfinance institutions that have emerged 
through CGAP, the World Bank-sponsored microfinance clearinghouse discussed in Part 
IV.C.  Without taking any position on the substance of those norms, we note that they 
possess several distinctive structural features that make them valuable models for private 
efforts to regulate peer-to-peer intermediaries: 
 They are emphatically transnational and directed at a broad range of legal systems 
and levels of regulatory development.  They contemplate sourcing funds for 
microfinance both abroad and at home, and consider the interaction of different 
legal systems in the process. 
138 Contra Raj M. Desai & Homi Kharas, Do Philanthropic Citizens Behave Like Governments?  Internet-
Based Platforms and the Diffusion of International Private Aid 24 (Brookings/Wolfensohn Center for 
Development Working Paper 12 (Oct. 2009) (recommending that host states in general, and India in 
particular, eliminate any regulatory barriers to highly concessional peer-to-peer inflows). 
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 They start from the premise that social impact—at policy, community, and 
individual recipient levels—and financial sustainability are both necessary 
objectives of microfinance. 
 They bring together public, private, and nonprofit actors in designing a regulatory 
regime that affects them all. 
 Partly owing to their transnational aspirations, but also reflecting the need for 
popular and regulatory legitimacy in a new field, the guidelines and advisories 
emerging out of the microfinance industry are not tied to rigid and static 
regulatory categories.  They explicitly contemplate both regulatory pluralism and 
continuing change in the industry. 
The result is an open and flexible self-regulatory paradigm designed to operate in widely 
different legal regimes, and mindful of the need for interaction among different regimes.  
Thus, for example, the consensus guidelines for regulating MFIs do not take a firm 
position on optimal corporate organization or specific chartering rules, but instead set 
forth substantive and institutional considerations for prudential and business-conduct 
regulation of financing for the poor.  Moreover, since diffusion of best practices has been 
a key objective of the recent efforts, the microfinance industry has developed 
increasingly sophisticated web-based technologies and networks for disseminating the 
knowledge they produce.139  While we endorse private ordering, we also note that 
competition among private regimes, and with public regimes, is more likely to achieve 
better financial and development outcomes. 
VI. Conclusion
The past decade has seen rapid financial innovation, growing pluralism, and 
fragmentation in development assistance.  This trend has proceeded in tandem with 
139 We take no position on whether it would be desirable to have greater regulatory competition among 
private actors, in relation either to MFIs or peer-to-peer intermediaries.  For discussion of the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of regulatory competition in this context, see Snyder, supra note 112, at 437-
42. 
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similar trends elsewhere in international finance.  In practice, what used to be distinct 
fields of foreign aid and private international finance are rapidly merging.  We have 
argued that these changes demand a new look at the regulatory regime governing 
development finance.  In particular, the rise of peer-to-peer intermediaries has meant that 
a growing number of unsophisticated funders and recipients have become involved in 
some of the riskiest activities in international finance.  The risks arise primarily because 
these transactions occur across jurisdictions with vastly different legal regimes and 
financial infrastructure, involve illiquid currencies, and are guided by what are often 
inexperienced and unregulated financial institutions that are themselves feeling their way 
in uncharted financial territory through trial and error.  The absence of agreed-upon 
uniform accountability standards for social performance in this field is at least as 
important as the lack of uniform criteria for financial disclosure. 
Against this background, we face a choice:  either to refine the regime for 
charities regulation in the funders’ home country to address the shortcomings in financial 
reporting, or to integrate the new aid intermediaries in the evolving regime for regulating 
international finance.  We suggest doing both, for the following reasons.  First, when
intermediaries promise repayment, they subject new aid funders to risks that are 
indistinguishable from those faced by traditional depositors and investors, even where 
they seek a social as well as a financial return on their investment.  This promise makes it 
appropriate to regulate intermediaries as financial institutions.  Second, so long as these 
intermediaries continue to rely, even in part, on tax-deductible donations, it makes sense 
to enhance the regime that aims primarily at protecting the public and private interests in 
ensuring that tax-deductible donations are used effectively.  Third, the regime for cross-
border regulatory cooperation is relatively robust in international finance, and virtually 
absent in charities regulation.  We believe that such cooperation—particularly in the 
areas of aid coordination, and negotiation of home and host country policy priorities—is 
essential to the success of the new mechanisms for mobilizing and delivering 
development finance.  Fourth, international finance is replete with examples of 
reasonably successful private and hybrid ordering regimes, which are especially 
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important for establishing accountability for the social outcomes of peer-to-peer 
development assistance. 
Our core argument, then, is that regulating peer-to-peer intermediaries must 
become part of an increasingly seamless web of regulating cross-border financial 
transactions to protect not only the interests of private market participants, but also the 
public interest in the fund-providing and fund-receiving states, as well as local, national 
and global financial stability.  The resulting regime must be transnational in scope and 
capable of adapting to continuous innovation, including the evolving mix of demands for 
financial and social returns.  If it works, the new regime will help mobilize more durable 
funds for development and instill confidence in the financial system among its many 
diverse stakeholders, including those who have been traditionally excluded from it and 
are most vulnerable to its failures—yet who also need it the most. 
